Executive report, January 20, 2005

TOWARDS AN AGENDA FOR MEANINGFUL HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED DEMOCRACY

Early Conclusions from the 1st and 2nd Round of the National Survey on Problems and Options of Indonesian Democratisation

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PART I

1. Introduction

This is an executive report of the early conclusions drawn from a national survey of the problems and options of meaningful human rights-based democracy in Indonesia. The full results, including issue-area and geographic qualifications, will be anaylised and presented in a final report to be released later this year.[1]

In January 2002, a conference on the democracy movement assigned a taskforce to carry out an academically sound nationwide survey that would facilitate the discussion of a fresh agenda for democratisation.[2] The taskforce appointed a team of researchers and constituted *DEMOS* to support the research and follow up the results. The work of the late founding members, Dr. Th. Sumartana and Munir, are especially acknowledged.

The survey has been carried out in two rounds, in 2003 and 2004, and is based on a pioneering framework for the assessment of democracy from below. It combines the theories and experiences drawn from studies of rights and institutions and social and political movements. Extensive interviews were held out with *circa* 800 experienced and reflective campaigners in all the provinces. These are not statistically selected respondents but carefully selected expert-informants. This would not have been possible without, first, close co-operation with pillars of the democracy movement and hundreds of experienced activists; second, support from Norwegian and Swedish public donors, the University of Oslo as well as the Ford and TIFA Foundations, *TEMPO,* the European Commission and others who have shared our concern and consistently respected the intellectual integrity of the team.

One year ago, *DEMOS* presented the conclusions from the first round of the survey. There were three major conclusions:
- First, that most of the new and supposedly pro-democratic rights and institutions had been hijacked by the elite.
- Second, that a series of new freedoms were important, but that the standard of socio-economic rights, rule of law and justice, accountable government and, most importantly, democratic representation was poor or very poor.
- Third, that not only people at large but also the activists who brought about democratic changes in the country could do little to improve the situation since they

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[1] It may be kept in mind from the outset that this is a general national survey, which by definition is not inclusive of detailed contextual case studies. Moreover, the survey is not based on statistically selected respondents but better: on the assessment of the problems and options by 798 carefully identified local democracy experts around the country serving as informants.

[2] For more information of the research and the discussions at the January 2002 conference, see the concluding report in Prasetyo, Priyono and Törnquist (2003)

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lacked the capacity to use the rights and institutions and mainly confined themselves to civil society work on the sidelines of the political system. (*DEMOS* 2004)

These conclusions have been put to test by three events and developments over the past year:
- First, by the *technically* successful general elections;
- Second, by the continuous discussion on what kind of democracy should be promoted;
- Third, by our own concluding second round of the survey.

The main body of the executive report addresses these developments with a special focus on the combined results of the 1st and 2nd rounds of the survey. Based on the new insights drawn from these results, we then turn to the question of how to move forward to a new agenda for meaningful human rights-based democracy in the latter part of the report.

2. The 2004 Elections as a Critical Test

In view of the extensive electoral innovations of 2004, to what extent did our critical preliminary conclusions hit the mark? Analysts have generally made three comments concerning the 2004 elections:

First, that the setback of the dominant parties and the rise of figures such as the new president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) was surprising;

Second, that it was remarkable that (apart from PKS) the activists that had brought democracy to Indonesia were barely evident;

Third, that Indonesia was to be congratulated for an improved electoral system and that the change of leaders took place in a free, fair and peaceful manner.

Did these comments prove any of our conclusions less valid? Or did the conclusions rather offer a more informed base for understanding the outcome of the elections?

The success of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and his top-down 'instantly' organised Democratic Party was predictable, taking into account the strong indications of the first round of the survey that the most serious problems facing democracy were:
- The defunct party system; and
- Political representation, which did not offer a viable democratic means to improving the rule of law, generate 'good governance' and improve the standard of living.

Similarly, the losses suffered by the PDI-P were expected and represent a clear illustration of the contradiction between the party's broad social basis amongst the poor on the one hand, and the lack of representation of their interests and ideas on the other. The severe problems of transforming and resurrecting the organisation through member activity, moreover, reflect the low scores obtained in the first round of the survey with

regard to members' control of the parties. There were very few signs of viable strategies and solid constituencies amongst the progressive actors who tried to reform parties from within. Even high profile elite-factions like that of Kwik Kian Gie in the PDI-P seemed to lack an organised base. To make things worse, Megawati's final decision as president was to confirm the revised law on regional governance in which the democratic potential of decentralisation was reduced, most damagingly by the removal of elected village councils.

In general, large sections of the population neither trusted the established parties nor the old 'alternative' populist politicians such as Megawati, Gus Dur and Amien Rais. (The latter two have also since lost ground within their own socio-religious constituencies, Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah respectively.) This was a major reason for the return through conservative populism of a managerial retired general, SBY, as the president of the nation, supported by a top businessman from the Soeharto era as his deputy, Jusuf Kalla. While SBY replaced his female predecessor almost in the same way as his military colleague Fidel Ramos a decade earlier in the Philippines, Kalla may nourish ambitions of becoming Indonesia's Thaksin, the moneyed prime minister of Thailand. Soon enough, Kalla thus captured the chairmanship of the demoralised bosses in Golkar.

Having lost the presidential race, Golkar were eager to regain access to the resources and privileges of the palace. While testifying to the oligarchic character of Indonesia's fledgling democracy, the conservative populists have thus bought themselves a formidable political machine. This, however, is only possibly at the price of not being able to handle Golkar like Soeharto did, namely as the party of the ruler, instead having to nourish the non-democratic character and vast vested interests of its petty-Soehartos around the country.

Similar vested interests within the military and the police are likely to hamper SBY's ambition to increase the capacity of the state to handle the question of crime, private security guards and militias, people's freedom from physical violence and fear, and justice, peace and development in Papua and Aceh. One recent case in point is the assassination of Munir and the reluctance so far to mobilise as much energy in the hunt for his killers as on Muslim terrorists. Another, of course, is the inability after the disastrous earthquake and tsunamis to deploy and mobilise the huge contingent of soldiers in Aceh for exclusively humanitarian relief and development efforts in co-operation with civic groups rather than upholding its repressive character.

This oligarchic character also casts doubts on the democratic potential of SBY's main promises to create new jobs and fight corruption. New jobs are supposed to be generated through the stimulation of business within a neo-liberal framework, not through a growth oriented pact between organised representatives from capital and labour. One-sided benefits to capital may thus undermine both the capacity of labour to use democracy and the capacity of the state to regulate public affairs to such an extent that what we get is a democracy without choices (i.e. that basic regulatory decisions cannot be implemented) and an increasingly informalised public administration – thus breeding more, not less,

corruption. Meanwhile, stagnant or reduced public support for universal social security and welfare measures tends to undermine democracy by boosting clientelism and alternative patronage via private (often religious and ethnic) organisations and political fixers and brokers who 'solve' the problems of loyal followers right down to neighbourhood level. The anti-corruption-campaign, moreover, is mainly a top down affair, based on the bureaucratic machinery and restricted by the vested interests of the elite. In other words, the campaign will suffer from the lack of organised pressure from below as it has not been made an integral part of democratisation.

The second major winner of the elections, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), is another example of the crisis of the party system and the defunct representation of interests and ideas. While the protest-vote for technocratic strongman SBY were mobilised through conservative populism, the support for the PKS was primarily the protest of a well organised religious community. The PKS demonstrated what can be done through sincerity, commitment, and transparency – a good lesson for the democracy movement. However, the PKS also has undemocratic potential with sectarian values and programmes, giving priority to one belief and certain specific group interests.

The PKS was the only organised force in the elections that represented some of the actors and dreams that brought fragments of democracy to Indonesia in 1998. The few analysts who asked 'why' this was the case were rarely able to give conclusive answers. Based on our data however, the inability of genuine democracy activists to make a difference was not a surprise – given their 'floating' character and confinement to civil society work and lobbying on the sidelines of the fledging democratic system. The same applies to the disturbing fact that efforts at decentralisation, in addition to have generated some much needed space to confront the central level oligarchy, have also paved the way for increasing and diverse forms of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN).

This is not to say that efforts at direct democracy at local level have been unimportant or insignificant. Our previous case studies (Prasetyo, Priyono and Törnquist 2003) clearly indicate that much vital work is being carried out, for instance in the disclosure of local cases of corruption or in demanding a reasonable standard of education. The main problems, as suggested by both our previous and new data, lie with the disparate agendas and actions and the lack of organised links to politics.

There is not much hope, therefore, that the picture will be radically altered in the forthcoming direct elections of local officials such as provincial governors, mayors and district heads. Our data suggests that the dominant tendencies will be money politics and competition between increasingly personality-oriented alliances made up of dominant politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and to some extent religious and ethnic leaders. This kind of direct election will neither be particularly beneficial for the development of democracy nor for the defence of pluralism and multi-culturalism.

Yet, of course, the peaceful and largely technically free and fair elections of 2004 were an important step forward. This, however, does not invalidate the critical conclusions drawn from the first round of the survey. One of the major arguments was precisely that our credible local informants opposed both the statements made by central-level experts

that democracy had collapsed and the arguments by structuralists that democracy was impossible. Certain critical freedoms (including to some extent the elections) were deemed to be fairly accurate.

This, however, is not to agree with the proposition (made by the outgoing European Union representative for example) that the 2004 elections proved Indonesian democracy to be consolidated, stable or 'well under way.'[3] Our first round results indicate clearly that while some 40% of informants deemed elections to be reasonably free and fair even before 2004, most of them believed that the contending parties and politicians were not controlled by party members, rarely represented the interests and opinions of the voters, were negatively influenced by money politics, abused religious and ethnic loyalties, and were bad at forming and running government. What is more, as we shall see from the new combined results – including those from the second round of the survey conducted after the parliamentary elections and on the basis of possibly less critical informants – there is absolutely no reason to alter this conclusion.

In other words, our results passed the critical test of the 2004 elections with distinction. Some basic freedoms and elections are available – which is very important, but they are largely in the hands of the elite. And in addition most of the party system and representation is defunct.

3. What Democracy is Assessed, and How?

Indonesia is not unique. The problem of representation is common in many countries where there have been attempts at shortcuts to democracy through elite-negotiations and top-down crafting of institutions. This is increasingly well recognised, not least by those who once promoted these 'instant' methods.[4] The emerging trend now is rather one of promoting representation by strengthening parties, party systems and civic education. (Cf. Törnquist 2005a) In the Indonesian context, for instance, the Dutch Institute for Multi Party Democracy has launched an extensive programme to this end. No matter how welcome it is, however, there are good reasons to be critical. Parties are important, but most of the existing formations are part of the problem of (the lack of) representation. The major questions, therefore, are rather how to reform or alter them and in what ways ordinary people and especially pro-democrats can be integrated into politics and to improve and use democracy.

This conclusion is not to take sides in the Indonesian debate during 2004 between advocates of liberal and so-called popular democracy (between the supporters of the Institute for Multi Party Democracy and those of INSIST[5]). This is an unfruitful debate that confuses the basic framework of democracy with the different (more or less liberal, socialist, or 'popular') policies that we may like to pursue through a democratic

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[3] *The Jakarta Post*, 10 December 2005
[4] For a most recent review, see the thematic issue of *Democratization,* Vol.11, No. 5, December 2004.
[5] Indonesian Society for Social Transformation.

infrastructure. At worst, therefore, the debate mainly serves the purpose of positioning leading individuals and organisations rather than strengthening the broadest possible unity in favour of the fundamentals of meaningful human rights-based democracy.

3.1 How to define and assess meaningful human rights-based democracy?

Fortunately there already exists widespread agreement amongst committed actors (such as the pro-democrats who entrusted us to carry out this research and the donors who sponsor it) that the continuous aim is 'meaningful human rights-based democracy'. The major challenge is instead to define and make analytical sense of this concept. What are the core elements of such a democracy and what would be the minimum requirements for generating it? If we cannot identify the contours of the intrinsic factors involved, how might we then be able to distinguish the key parameters and collect information about them?

In other words, what is the basis for our assessment of the problems and options of meaningful human rights-based democracy in Indonesia? What is the framework and method for this study?[6]

The most usual understanding of 'meaningful' is functional: the instruments of human rights-based democracy may not be perfect, but citizens at large must at the very least find that the concrete instruments that are available in their own contexts are relevant to their efforts to control and influence what they deem to be matters of common concern.

What are the aims and means of democracy? According to Beetham (1999) and Beetham et.al (2002), scholars tend to agree that the aim of democracy is popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. This, according to the same authors, requires a set of general principles: everybody's right and ability to *participate*, the *authorisation* of representatives and officials, their *representation* of main currents of poplar opinion and the social composition of people – in addition to being continuously responsive to the opinions and interests of the people and *accountable* (directly or indirectly) to the citizens for what they have done; which in turn requires *transparency*. Finally, while equality applies implicitly to all these principles, *solidarity* among the citizens and others who fight for democracy is just as fundamental. Thus most, if not all, of these general principles also call for the additional principles of *human rights*.[7]

Aside from the fact that there must be basic correspondence between the officially delineated *demos* and how people identify themselves in public matters,[8] those fundamental principles call for a set of semi-universal instruments on different levels in a given polity that are supposed to promote:

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[6] In this report we have to be brief. For a more extensive presentation and discussion of our framework, see Törnquist (2005b).

[7] In terms of every human being's right to justice and freedom, regardless of ethnicity, race, religion and social background, in addition to basic social and economic needs.

[8] Which we address by asking how the people that our informants work with identify themselves in public matters: as Indonesians or members of the districts, on the one hand, or as members of a local or religious or ethnic community, on the other.

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Box 1. The 40 instruments of democracy

Rights and institutions to promote:

I : Citizenship, Law and Rights
1. Equal citizenship
2. The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees
3. Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts

4. Government support and respect for international law and UN human rights treaties
5. Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law
6. Equal and secure access to justice
7. The integrity and independence of the judiciary

8. Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it
9. Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation
10. Freedom to carry out trade union activity
11. Freedom of religion and belief
12. Freedom of language and culture
13. Gender equality and emancipation
14. The rights of children
15. The right to employment, social security and other basic needs
16. The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties
17. Good corporate governance and business regulations in the public interest

II: Representative and accountable government
18. Free and fair general elections at central, regional, and local levels
19. Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads
20. Freedom to form parties, recruit members, and campaign for office
21. Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties
22. Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties
23. Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties
24. Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties to their constituencies
25. Parties ability to form and run government

26. The transparency and accountability of elected government, at all levels
27. The transparency and accountability of the executive/public civil servants, at all levels
28. Democratic decentralisation of government on the basis of the subsidiarity principle
29. The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public
30. The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime
31. The independence of the government from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)
32. Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power

III: Democratically oriented civil society and direct participation
33. Freedom of the press, art and academic world
34. Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world
35. Citizens' participation in extensive independent civic associations
36. Transparency, accountability and democracy within civic organisations
37. All social groups' – including women's – extensive access to and participation in public life

38. Peoples' direct contact with the public services and servants
39. Peoples' direct contact with their political representatives
40. Government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policymaking and the execution of public decisions.

NB!   Those 40 instruments were measured in the 2nd round of the survey. In the 1st round, however, only 35 were applied. The consolidated data, therefore relates to those 35 instruments only. In the list above, the instruments being combined in the consolidated data are underlined.

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- Equal citizenship, rule of law, justice, civil and political rights, and socio-economic rights in terms of basic needs;[9]
- Democratic elections, representation, and responsive and accountable government and public administration;
- Free and democratically oriented media, art, academia, civil society and other forms of additional popular participation. Beetham et. al. (2002) identifies some 85 semi-universal instruments. We have revised these and cut them down to 40 – see box 1!

To be meaningful, these instruments must not merely exist; they must also perform well.[10] This is not to evaluate whether the instruments are producing policies to our liking or not – only the extent to which each instrument fulfils its purpose of contributing to the democratic infrastructure. For instance, to what extent are the institutions that are supposed to uphold equal citizenship really doing that? The reasons for poor performance may be lack of will, resources and capacities or a combination thereof, but that is another matter.

In addition, studies and experience that focus less on institutions and more on movements and actors indicate that two other factors are also necessary for a democracy to be defined as meaningful. First, since institutions that perform well may be limited whilst a meaningful democracy calls for rights and institutions that have a reasonable scope, we must also inquire to what extent the instruments are geographically well spread and cover the issues that most people consider to be of public concern.[11]

Second, since rights and institutions do not emerge and act by themselves, we need to know the extent to which citizens at large (and not only the elite) are willing and capable of promoting and using them. This is how we try to analyse the dynamics of democratisation and democracy beyond the rigid mapping of the state of affairs that characterises many mainstream assessments of democracy. Citizens' democratic capacity is primarily about effective presence in various spheres and arenas of the political landscape,[12] effective politicisation of issues and interests, effective mobilisation and effective strategies for the promotion and use of the instruments of democracy. This in

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[9] After all, it is intrinsic to a meaningful democracy that people can survive and have some minimum degree of autonomy.

[10] In the first round of the survey we used the concept of quality – implying procedure, content as well as result – but opted in the second round for the more straight forward 'performance', which was easier to comprehend.

[11] The combination of a rather wide scope and bad performance because of poor resources and institutional power thus equals what is often called 'choice-less' democracies.

[12] In brief, one may distinguish between spheres (and arenas within them) that are related to the state, business, self-managed units (such as co-operatives) as well as the private and public domains within and in between them. (The public sphere/domain may be defined as a framework of public and open institutions, forums and practices – as opposed to private and closed ones – for citizens to deliberate, negotiate, and co-operate. A public sphere is, thus, not necessarily managed by the state or government. Similarly, 'civil society' in terms of citizens' organisations may be more or less public or private.) These spheres (and arenas) may be located on the central and local levels as well as in the links between them; structured, then, according to the logic of territories or sectors. Within the spaces and on the arenas, there may be more or less open space for various actors.

turn implies that the actors are well informed about power relations and other conditions – though not necessarily that the conditions as such are ideal.[13] In short, a meaningful democracy must be a *substantial democracy.*

Extreme rightist and leftists oppose this position. They argue that while some human rights may be omitted, certain pre-conditions and outcomes in terms of power relations are inseparable elements of democracy. The radical rightists say, for instance, that free markets and private ownership are essential. Thus it is argued that the scope of democracy must be limited, that different ideologies are undemocratic and that therefore they must to be fought and opposed by all means, irrespective of human rights. The radical left on the other hand tend to argue that democracy will be limited to the bourgeoisie unless citizens are not only politically but also socially and economically equal. Thus it is argued that the scope of democracy must be expanded to include some kind of socialism, and that those who object to this are undemocratic and should not be protected against popular sovereignty by certain human rights.

Both these tendencies are rejected as they tend to undermine a meaningful, or substantial, democracy. 'Real' powers are crucial conditions for what can be done; and are indeed also crucial to what we use democracy for. Personally, for instance, we may like to use it to foster social and economic equality. But to widen the concept of democracy to include conditions that are not absolutely necessary even for a substantial democracy, or how we wish to change or alter those conditions, would not just be unproductive in scholarly terms with respect to the unclear delimitations of the dependent and independent variables. One would also compromise human rights and prevent alliances with others who agree on the fundamental importance of meaningful human rights-based democracy but do not subscribe to politics of socio-economic equality.

This has all too often been the case. In the fifties for instance, both rightists and leftists gave priority to rival positions in the cold war rather than to upholding of the democracy that they themselves had introduced in a liberation struggle and then institutionalised. The importance of the core instruments of substantial human rights-based democracy must not be negated. That means to neglect the beauty of democracy in terms of its potential to limit the use of raw power and even enable the powerless to increase their political capacity to thus alter their conditions in life. The politics of democratisation is to enhance that potential.

In conclusion, we deem the thirteen questions in box 2 to capture the essence of the variables that concerned scholars would agree there is a need to collect information about in order to assess the problems and options of meaningful human rights-based

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[13] The position in between idealism and structuralism is one's ability to read, adjust to and make use of the prevailing conditions, to thus make one's capacity to promote and use the instruments of democracy real. What we need to know, therefore, is how the actors relate to the conditions. On the basis of related research, we have opted for including the most important variable in the social movement paradigm, opportunity structure, and three of the basic dimensions in Bourdieu's studies of dominance: sources of power, transformation of power and habitus (what the informants, on reflection, deem to be the most important values, ideas and experiences that they, as well as dominant actors, are guided by, consciously or unconsciously).

democracy. We combine a descriptive and explanatory approach. On the one hand we collect empirical information with regard to each of the thirteen variables for straight-forward descriptive purposes, thus mapping the state of democracy. On the other hand we also contribute to explaining the state of affairs and to generate policy relevant proposals. This is done by reformulating vital academic as well as more popular arguments and theses inside and outside Indonesia with regard to democratisation into hypotheses – which are then brought to test by being confronted by the empirical information about the various variables.

Before we can present the results however (and discuss the viability of different theories concerning the relationship between the variables as well as initiate deliberations on what should be done) we must also discuss the best sources of information.

Box 2. The 13 major questions used to assess meaningful Human Rights-based democracy from below

Intrinsic factors

- political identity/*demos*
  1. How do people identify themselves in public matters (as Indonesians or members of districts – or as members of a local or religious or ethnic community)?
- performance of instruments
  2. What is the performance of the 40 major instruments of democracy, and has performance improved or deteriorated since the 1999 elections?
- scope of instruments
  3. What is the geographical and issue related scope of the 40 instruments of democracy, and has it has improved or deteriorated since the 1999 elections?
- actors' relation to instruments
  4. How do vital actors relate to the 40 instruments of democracy (promote and use, use only, sometimes use, bypass/abuse), and in relation to what instruments are they strong or weak?
  5. What do pro-democracy actors deem to be the pros and cons of working with the 40 instruments of democracy?
- actors' capacity to promote and use or abuse instruments
  6. In what spheres of the widely defined political landscape are the actors present?
  7. In what way do the actors politicise issues, interests and ideas?
  8. In what ways do the actors mobilise popular support/involve people in politics?
  9. What strategies do the actors apply in making their way through or avoiding the political system?

Link to non-intrinsic conditions

- actors' capacity to read, adjust to and make use of structural and other conditions
  10. What are the structural political opportunities for the actors?
  11. What sources of power do the actors rely on?
  12. How do the actors attempts to transform those powers into authority, legitimacy and thus political influence?
  13. What kind of values, ideas and experiences are the actors consciously or unconsciously guided by in their public activities?

3.2 Assessment from below

What would the best sources be in order to answer the thirteen main questions in our framework? Given that our aim is the best possible general analysis within a short period of time and with limited resources, not close contextual case studies, a fundamental problem is the poor availability and standard of data-banks and the limitations of previous research. A quick look at the recommendations on data collection in IDEA's assessment handbook for instance (Beetham et.al. 2002) made us realise that most of the (limited number of) sources available would either be too general, not entirely relevant or reliable. Bluntly speaking, recommendations like those made in IDEA's handbook make very little sense in a developing country like Indonesia. Given the lack of existing sources and the need therefore to rely primarily on interviews, our next priority was to formulate questions and assemble information in such a way that we could reach beyond the usual

metropolitan and elite oriented surveys and instead obtain information about the experiences and efforts of ordinary people in local contexts.

The method of approaching 'ordinary people' via opinion polls was therefore not an option. We had to focus on how to gain access to the experts' knowledge of complicated processes, not just opinions. Of course, people's perceptions matter, but realities do exist beyond post-modern interpretations. Having to make priorities, moreover, we were simply not in command of what various opinion-poll-institutes seem to take for granted: sufficient knowledge of various contexts to formulate contextualised questions that ordinary people would be able to make sense of.

We turned instead to discussions on how to find a good alternative to the limited perspectives of the 'air conditioned' metropolitan experts that are usually consulted. In contrast to the other extreme, the so-called participatory appraisals among local people, our solution was the realistic compromise of holding on to our theoretically structured assessment scheme and to the consultation of experts – but to identify the experts among reflective and thoroughly grounded local activists with extensive experience gained from their efforts at promoting democracy in the fourteen main issue-areas of pro-democratic activity around the country that we had identified in previous studies.

These informants would then be asked questions concerning the standard of the instruments of democracy, as well as the will and capacity of both pro-democracy and dominant actors to relate to these instruments. In the first case the informants would be instructed to answer with regard to democracy-actors they know of; in the second case they would be requested to identify and analyse the three most powerful actors (i.e. dominant actors) in the informants' contexts. Each informant would chose to reply with regard to either their own context or the country as a whole, but having done so, they would have to be consistent throughout the questionnaire.

Moreover, all the interviews would be conducted by trained local assistants capable of relating the general questions to local conditions. Finally, the interviews would be conducted in two rounds, thus allowing for a trial and error process that would both help us to improve on the questions and to introduce generally well known examples in relation to most of them.

The ideal equation would thus be two informants (independent of each other) within each of the fourteen issue areas in thirty-two provinces, or a total of 896 informants. Meanwhile, our assessment framework had generated a questionnaire with more than 300 questions and our tests indicated that each interview might take as long as four to six hours – quite a challenge. But thanks to close co-operation with the democracy movement the outcome was satisfactory. Informants with tight schedules showed remarkable understanding and patience with the long questionnaire and time-consuming interviews for instance. Due to security problems in some provinces, time constraints,

various misunderstandings and a few unreliable local assistants we did not in the final count obtain 896 valid questionnaires – but we did get about 800.[14]

The identification of the informants – our main sources of information – was thus critical. The first step was the selection of the main issue-areas of pro-democracy work in Indonesia. This was done on the basis of our earlier survey as well as case studies made on the post-Soeharto democracy movement in addition to previous comparative research (Prasetyo, Priyono and Törnquist 2003 and e.g. Törnquist 2002 and Harriss et.al. 2004) The main issue-areas within which we identified experts-informants for the first round survey were the rights, interests and capacity related to:
1. The control of land
2. Labour
3. Urban poor
4. Human rights
5. The struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governance'
6. The attempts to democratise the party system, and
7. The promotion of pluralism and religious and ethnic reconciliation.

During the second round, expert-informants have been consulted within the following issue-areas:
8. The improvement and democratisation of education
9. The promotion of professionalism as part of good governance in public and private sectors
10. The freedom, independence and quality of media
11. The promotion of gender equality and feminist perspectives
12. The improvement of alternative representation on the local level
13. The attempts to form popular rooted political parties and
14. The attempts to promote interest-based mass organisations.

The second step was the identification and mobilisation of representatives-*cum*-key-informants among *DEMOS'* associates in the thirty-two provinces of the country. These representatives have played an important role in supplementing our knowledge and contacts from previous research. They have helped us to identify strategic processes in the provinces that relate to the various issue-areas and they have suggested and assisted us in approaching, within these contexts, informants for the interviews. Since the representatives must be accountable for their work, their identities are known to our quality-auditors,[15] but the informants remain anonymous. The local representatives have also helped us in the selection, training and supervision of the some 100 local assistants who have carried out the interviews. The role of these assistants has been crucial since they had to understand and be able to clarify each question, preferably by giving additional contextual examples.

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[14] The exact number of valid questionnaires is 798; 363 in the first round of the survey and 435 in the second round.
[15] Unless security conditions dictate otherwise.

In spite of all this, much of the inevitable weaknesses of working with mass data and relying on informants remain and must be kept in mind: we are not able to make full contextual case studies, and the background, personal opinions and other biases of the experts may have influenced their statements and estimates. This may be partly handled by comparisons within the material, including between information from experts related to different issue-areas, regions and gender. We shall come back to the details in the full report. In any case, mass data based analysis is necessary as a supplement to case-studies in order to reach general conclusions. And our grounded informants are possibly the most knowledgeable experts of the problems of democracy.

Supplementary information and quality-checks are also made available through national and regional assessment councils with senior scholars and reflective activists. This is where the team present the results and tentative analysis. Input given at various meetings held with interested organisations is also important. Finally, in conjunction with the second round of the survey, we have added a series of semi-structured and open ended interviews with particularly experienced informants in three of the issue areas that stood out as strategically important based on the results of the first round survey, namely alternative local representation, party building, and attempts to broaden interest-based mass organisations.[16] In the process of disseminating and discussing the emerging combined results from the first and second rounds of the survey, we shall also carry out a mini-re-survey amongst a limited number of informants to try to glean some preliminary ideas of changes over time. In November this year, the concluding report of the survey will be presented and discussed at a conference that will be held to discuss the drafting of a new agenda for meaningful human rights-based democracy. In conjunction with the conference there will also be a graduate course for students and scholars who wish to follow up the results and further Indonesian studies on the problems of democracy.

4. Main Results and Conclusions

4.1 Introduction

Given the highly contested nature of several of the issue-areas within which we identified informants for the first round of the survey, one may suspect that we initially received particularly critical responses. Interestingly, the informants from the second round of less 'hot' issue areas tend to confirm our previous general conclusions. Importantly, the combined results from the 1st and 2nd round of the survey also add critical qualifications and specifications with regard to the various instruments of democracy, the capacity of the actors to use and improve them as well as differences between issue-areas and regions.

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[16] Thirty-five extensive interviews were carried out by the central team with nine informants in Sumatra, fourteen in Java, including Jakarta, three in Kalimantan, four in Sulawesi, two in East Nusa Tenggara, and one in Bali, Papua and Maluku respectively.

While the executive report from the first round of the survey spoke of a hijacked democracy with important freedoms but bad tools and representation in addition to marginalised citizens and pro-democrats – this second report based on the survey as a whole both substantiates the rather negative conclusions of first assessment as well as identifying options for moving forward.

The survey may well comprise the most comprehensive and systematic information that is currently available on the problems of and options for human rights-based democracy in Indonesia. Of course the team may have set aside some crucial questions, and the local experts from around the country may sometimes be mistaken in their assessment. But we have striven to include the thirteen key variables and the some three-hundred and thirty questions that concerned scholars ought to be able to agree on. In addition, eight hundred or so experts on the promotion of democracy within fourteen issue areas in most provinces of the country that have spent between four to six hours each to answer our questions can hardly be ignored.[17] Interestingly, almost all the informants chose to answer the questions in relation to their local contexts rather than the country as a whole, thus possibly increasing the quality of their information. So long as nobody is able to mobilise theoretically convincing arguments and more solid data to suggest that critical aspects have been set aside, that the informants are generally mistaken or that the team has made faulty calculations and poor analysis, one may thus hope that the results of the survey will form the point of departure for both improvements and discussion on a more efficient agenda for meaningful human rights-based democracy.

4.2 Four main conclusions

Generally speaking, the combined results from the survey point to four major conclusions concerning the problems and options for how to promote human rights-based democracy in Indonesia:

I There are critical basic freedoms, but a severe democratic deficit of other rights and institutions, including people's identification with the national and regional *demos*.

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[17] All provinces are well represented by the informants with exceptions in the cases of South Sumatra, Bangka Belitung and West Kalimantan and a minor region-wise over-representation of Sumatra. The informants in different issue-areas are fairly well spread out amongst the 32 provinces with the exception of informants (in the first round of the survey) related to urban-poor (void in 15 provinces), land struggle (void in 6 provinces), religious representation (void in 14 provinces), labour (void in 10 provinces), politicians trying to reform parties (void in 9 provinces), anti-corruption (void in 8 provinces) and human rights (void in 8 provinces). From the 2nd round we have gaps of informants in education and gender issue (2 provinces each), professionalism (3 provinces), local representation and broadening mass movement (5 provinces each), press & journalism (1 province), and party building (4 provinces). The major drawback is that the character of the informants reflects some of the weaknesses of the democracy movement. Asking for experienced and reflective sources, the young (35 years and under) and women tend not to be well represented (36% and 17.4% of the informants respectively). As with any country, most of the expert-informants tend to be related to active organisations, and in the case of Indonesia to NGO's rather than mass-organisations. Fro example, 28% of the informants are NGO activists or social workers, 18% are private professionals, 13% are labourers or fisherfolk, 12% are intellectuals, 9% are entrepreneurs and business people, 8% are politicians, 4 % are civil servants and 9% have other professions.)

II There are free and fair elections, but only of unrepresentative and unresponsive parties and politicians.

III The dominant members of elite tend to adjust to the new game of democracy but monopolises it, bending and abusing the rules of the game as they go.

IV The agents of change that brought democracy to Indonesia are still critical as civic activists and pressure groups but are 'floating' in the margins of the fledgling democratic system, thus being unable to make a real impact.

These conclusions will be presented one by one. In each case we shall focus on the general trends. There will also be some early notes on specificities regarding issue areas and regions, but most of these qualifications will have to wait until the concluding book.[18]

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[18] The combination of data from the first and second rounds is time-consuming and complicated due to improvements in the questionnaire. Some data from the first round cannot be added to that obtained from the second round without manual adjustments and in some cases re-inputting raw data. In this process we have given first priority to general results on all variables.

PART II

5. Conclusion I: Democratic Deficit of Rights & Institutions

In addition to quite rightly congratulating Indonesia for its technically successful elections in 2004, many analysts have also stated that democracy in the country seems to be well under way.

Is this true? Is Indonesian democratisation in a good state of affairs? Around 800 locally grounded experts suggest otherwise. In summary, they conclude that there are vital basic freedoms – but a severe democratic deficit of other instruments of democracy, including poor popular identification with the national and regional 'demos'.

5.1. Important freedoms and new institutions: the main game in town…

The consolidated data drawn from the survey confirms our previous conclusion that the centrally-based experts who say that democratisation has collapsed are wrong. The local democracy experts make more balanced judgements.

First, there are good freedoms which must be defended. Their scope is generally deemed less favourable than their performance but, with some interesting exceptions, more than 50% of the informants deem both the performance and scope of the following rights and institutions to be reasonably good:

Table 5.1.1 Rights and institutions that according to 50% or more of the informants have reasonably good performance and scope.

No.	Rights and institutions	Good performance	Good scope
1.	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	81%	67%
2.	Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture	81%	67%
3.	Freedom to form political parties, recruit members, and campaign for office	74%	68%
4.	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civic associations	67%	57%
5.	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	66%	(47%)
6.	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	64%	57%
7.	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	61%	52%
8.	Gender equality and emancipation	54%	(39%)
9.	All social groups' – including women's – extensive access to and participation in public life	51%	(41%)
10.	Free and fair general elections	(48%)	55%

It is worth noting though, that the performance-rate for elections is lower than the scope (48% vs. 55%), and that the scope-rate of the rights and institutions to promote 'freedom of trade unions' and 'gender equality' are deemed to be decisively lower than the performance-rate. There are few significant variations between the issue areas and regions.[19]

Second, even though our critical activist-informants hesitate, more than 47% of them have not lost faith in trying to both use and promote some 35% of the instruments of democracy – which are almost exactly the same as those that they deemed to have a reasonable performance and scope:[20]

Table 5.1.2 Proportion of the informants who both promote and use rights and institutions.

No.	Rights and institutions	%
1.	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	70%
2.	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civic associations	63%
3.	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	57%
4.	Gender equality and emancipation	57%
5.	All social groups' – including women's – extensive access to and participation in public life	56%
6.	Equal citizenship	53%
7.	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civic organisations	52%
8.	Free and fair general elections	52%
9.	Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture	50%
10.	Government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policymaking and the execution of public decisions.	49%
11.	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	48%
12.	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	47%

While once again there are few significant regional variations, it is interesting to note that almost all informants within the first round of the survey are more engaged in both using and promoting rights and institutions than those in the second round.

Third, rights and institutions in favour of technically free and fair elections are deemed rather favourably. Forty-eight percent of the informants say that performance is reasonably good, 55% say the scope is reasonably broad and 52% must think that they make sense since they try to both promote and use them.

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[19] The only significant regional difference is that informants in Eastern Indonesia seem to be generally less impressed. One of the interesting issue-area differences is that reformist party politicians and anti-corruption activists are more positive than others, whilst pro-democrats working on gender issues and (with regard to scope) those on professionalism and media and culture seem to be more negative.

[20] The only interesting exceptions are that rights and institutions in favour of 'equal citizenship', 'the right to employment, social security and other basic needs', 'freedom to carry out trade union activity' and 'freedom from physical violence and the fear of it' seem to make some sense even though their performance and scope were not assessed favourably, while the reasonably positively assessed rights and institutions in favour of 'freedom to form parties, recruit members, and campaign for office' only make sense to about 40% of the informants.

Fourth, even our critical local activist-informants clearly state that the dominant actors in their contexts do *not* in the first instance try to avoid the instruments that are normally associated with democracy. It is true that not more than 14% both promote *and* use the rights and institutions and that many also abuse them, but more remarkably, only 14% tend to bypass them entirely. In other words, a very clear majority at least 'use' or 'use and abuse' the instruments that are supposed to favour democracy. Of course it is quite another matter whether these instruments really support democracy – and we shall soon turn to that. But our conclusion is also supported by the information concerning the dominant actors' strategies. We shall return to the details of this in our third main conclusion, but in short there is no doubt that the elite in general has formally acknowledged democracy as 'the main game in town'.

5.2.   …(but)most instruments of democracy are defunct.

The overall picture of Indonesia's democracy, however, is a gloomy one.

(1) Most of the rights and institutions are deemed to be poor or very poor.
(2) There are few signs of improvements – and there are crucial setbacks.
(3) Several critical instruments do not make sense even to committed democrats.
(4) The elite may adjust to the new game of democracy but monopolises it, bending and abusing the rules of the game as they go.
(5) Informants are worried about Indonesia's economic independence.
(6) While several indicators point to few regional differences, there is a disturbingly high level of identification in public matters with local, religious and ethnic communities rather than with Indonesian and regional citizenship.

We shall discuss these arguments one by one.

(1) With the exception of the instruments referred to previously in 5.1, the performance and scope of most the instruments of democracy are deemed to be poor.

Interestingly, Indonesia is clearly more unified than the issue-areas are. There are few substantial differences from the general pattern between the various regions, but quite a few amongst informants from different issue areas. For instance, informants related to democratisation of parties and party building and to some extent gender issues tend to be less critical than others, especially those working on land problems, labour, urban poor, anti-corruption and human rights.

Table 5.2.1 Rights & institutions that according to 50% or more of the informants have poor performance & scope.[21]

No.	Rights and institutions	Poor performance	Poor scope
1.	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	93%	75%
2.	Political parties' independence from money politics and powerful vested interests	91%	69%
3.	Government's independence of strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	90%	74%
4.	Equal and secure access to justice and the integrity and independence of the judiciary	87%	76%
5.	The transparency and accountability of the executive/public civil servants, on all levels	87%	73%
6.	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	86%	73%
7.	Membership control of political parties, and parties responsiveness and accountability to their constituencies	84%	71%
8.	People's direct contact with political representatives and the public services and servants	83%	70%
9.	Good corporate governance and business regulations in the public interest	83%	<u>95%</u>
10.	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	82%	73%
11.	The independence of the government from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	83%	69%
12.	Political parties' reflection of vital issues and interests among people	81%	70%
13.	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	81%	73%
14.	Political parties' ability to form and run government	80%	70%
15.	The transparency and accountability of elected government, on all levels	77%	71%
16.	The rights of children	75%	71%
17.	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	74%	69%
18.	Government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policymaking and the execution of public decisions.	72%	73%
19.	Government support and respect for international law and UN human rights treaties	71%	58%
20.	Equal citizenship	70%	67%
21.	Democratic decentralisation of government on the basis of the subsidiarity principle	68%	66%
22.	Political parties' abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines	65%	58%
23.	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	64%	61%
24.	The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees and reconciliation of horizontal conflict	63%	70%
25.	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civic organisations	56%	59%

(2) It is true that the performance and scope of certain rights and institutions have improved according to more than 60% of the informants – but those improved instruments are almost the same as those that were assessed positively in the first

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[21] Listed in order of bad performance; particularly poor scope underlined.

place, and not the troublesome ones.[22] And again, there are fewer differences between the various regions than the issue-areas.

Table 5.2.2   Rights and institutions that more than 60% of the informants say have improved since 1999.

No.	Rights and institutions	Performance	Scope
1.	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	75%	69%
2.	Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture	62%	(56%)
3.	Freedom to form political parties, recruit members, and campaign for office	67%	66%
4.	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civic associations	63%	61%
5.	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	61%	60%
6.	Regular and competitive general election	(51%)	84%

In addition, many informants even deem some very crucial rights and institutions to have deteriorated since 1999.

Table 5.2.3   Rights and institutions that 30% or more of the informants say have deteriorated since 1999

No.	Rights and institutions	Performance	Scope
1.	Political parties' independence of money politics and powerful vested interests	43%	37%
2.	Government's independence of strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	35%	31%
3.	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	38%	30%
4.	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	35%	31%
5.	The independence of the government from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	32%	(26%)
6.	Equal and secure access to justice and the integrity and independence of the judiciary	31%	(24%)

(3) While our committed informants have not lost faith in trying to promote and use most instruments of democracy, it is equally important to note that the standard of most instruments is so low that activists often seem to hesitate. Only 14% of the rights and institutions are both used *and* promoted by more than 55% of the informants. The highest score is only 70% (freedom of speech, assembly and organisation). About two-thirds of the instruments of democracy are both used and promoted by less than 47% of our democratically committed informants. Even worse, 9-27 % of the informants find that these rights and institutions are so poor that they prefer to seek alternatives.

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[22] The exceptions are 'free and fair elections', 'gender equality and emancipation', and 'all social groups' – including women's – extensive access to and participation in public life' which are not among the improved instruments.

Table 5.2.4 Rights and institutions that informants say make sense to both use and promote, and rights and institutions which democracy activists try to find alternatives to.[23]

(Listed in order of worst cases.)

No.	Rights and institutions	both use and improve	find alternative
1.	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	28%	27%
2.	The independence of the government from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	30%	19%
3.	Political parties' ability to form and run government	30%	19%
4.	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	32%	24%
5.	Membership control of political parties, and parties' responsiveness and accountability to their constituencies	33%	21%
6.	Political parties' abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines	33%	19%
7.	Good corporate governance and business regulations in the public interest	33%	17%
8.	Political parties' independence from money politics and powerful vested interests	35%	24%
9.	People's direct contact with political representatives and public services and servants	37%	15%
10.	Political parties' reflection of critical issues and interests among people	38%	18%
11.	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	39%	19%
12.	Government support and respect for international law and UN human rights treaties	41%	11%
13.	Freedom to form political parties, recruit members, and campaign for office	42%	13%
14.	The transparency and accountability of the executive/public civil servants, on all levels	43%	13%
15.	Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	44%	18%
16.	The transparency and accountability of elected government, on all levels	44%	13%
17.	Equal and secure access to justice and the integrity and independence of the judiciary	45%	15%
18.	Democratic decentralisation of government on the basis of the subsidiarity principle	45%	12%
19.	Freedom to carry out trade union activities	45%	(9%)
20.	The rights of children	45%	(9%)
21.	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	46%	13%
22.	The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees and reconciliation of horizontal conflict	46%	12%

The rights and institutions that make least sense are with very few exceptions the same as those already listed as most troublesome, with regards to both performance and scope. In other words, several indicators point clearly to the same rotten eggs.

Once again it is evident that there are fewer differences between the regions than there are between the issue-areas, possibly with the exception of politically unstable areas such as Aceh. Some of the regional differences include: informants in Sulawesi finding that political parties' ability to form and run government makes more sense than it does in other areas; informants in Kalimantan are unusually positive about the

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[23] In the table we have only included rights and institutions that less than 47 % of the informants say make sense to both use and improve and rights and institutions which 10-25% of the informants try to find alternatives to.

freedom of parties; and informants in Sumatra find the instruments related to good corporate governance, the subordination of government and the bureaucracy to the rule of law, political parties' reflection of critical interests and issues, the struggle against militias and the transparency and accountability of the military and police to be less meaningful than in other areas. Informants from Eastern Indonesia agree with regard to the transparency and accountability of the military and police.

Frequent variations between the issue areas calls for closer examination. One pattern that is immediately evident is that informants working on or related to political parties, human rights and the urban poor tend to agree that the rights and institutions make sense and that those fighting corruption are both eager to try and use and improve those instruments that are supposed favour democracy, but also avoid others and seek alternatives. Overall, the instruments that are supposed to favour the accountability of the military and police are deemed to make little sense.

(4) Whilst our informants acknowledge that the elite tend to formally adjust to the new democratic game, they also unanimously assert that the rules are bent and abused, and that the dominant actors' main interest lies in accessing and making use of public resources for their own benefit while paying lip-service to the new rights and institutions, resorting to authoritarian methods only as a last resort.

(5) A well functioning democracy presupposes the independence of the government from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law). As we have seen, the performance and scope of instruments that exist to promote this independence however, are deemed to be poor by 82% and 69% of the informants respectively. Given indications given in other parts of the survey, there is no doubt that the informants' main concern is with respect to the debt-trap, foreign business and organisations such as the International Monetary Fund.

(6) Another prerequisite of democracy is a correspondence between the officially delineated *demos* and how people identify themselves in public matters. This does not seem to have been at all secured in Indonesia. Our informants say that only about 39% of the people with whom they work tend in the first instance to identify themselves as Indonesians. Only 47% tend to identify themselves as Indonesians or as members of their *kabupaten/kota* in the first or second instance. Forty-nine percent tend in the first or second instance to identify themselves as belonging to a local or religious or ethnic community. In fact as many as 38% state that in the first or second instance they identify themselves as members of a religious or ethnic community, with a clear emphasis on the latter.

The only major regional differences are the figures for Eastern Indonesia (with high degree of ethnic identity) and, perhaps not surprisingly, for Aceh and Papua. The variations amongst the issue areas include high scores on ethnic identity from informants related to issues of urban poor and human rights; high scores for religious identity amongst activists concerned with the reforming of political parties and religious reconciliation; and high numbers for national identity from informants related to education, professionalism, media and party building.

These figures should be approached with some caution. First, most of our informants' statements do not refer to the context of Indonesia as a whole. Second, one should also make comparisons, both over time and with other countries. So far we have not found good data with which to make comparisons,[24] but the indications do signal a crisis of the Indonesian nation state project and are not encouraging for democracy. Third, however, this does not mean that there are major differences between the regions. In fact, our survey suggests that there are far less regional differences with regard to all aspects of democracy than between informants from various issue-areas. Thus, while the problems of and options for democracy seem to be remarkably similar around the country, people in different sectors have different perspectives and do not seem to identify clearly with a common project.

Table 5.2.5 How do people that pro-democrats work with tend to identify themselves in public matters?

No.	Type of identity	1st priority	1st + 2nd priority	1st priority in Aceh and Papua
1.	As Indonesian citizens	39%	24%	19%
2.	As citizens of province/district	15%	23%	18%
3.	As part of local community/ *desa*	11%	11%	14%
4.	As part of ethnic community	20%	20%	40%
5.	As part of religious community	12%	18%	10%
6.	No data	3%	3%	
	TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Moreover, informants related to issues of urban poverty and corruption give particularly low ratings for Indonesian identification – as do informants in Aceh, Papua and Eastern Indonesia. Ethnic identity scores high amongst informants related to urban poor, human rights – as well as those in Aceh, Papua and Eastern Indonesia. Religious identity is particularly high amongst informants within political parties and those focusing on reconciliation. Informants related to anti-corruption identify particularly with the provinces and districts.

5.3. Conclusion and recommendations: acknowledge the deficiencies of the crafting of institutions and focus on the root causes.

In summary, several clear-cut indicators point to the fact that Indonesian democracy is not 'well under way' and 'irreversible'. Certain important freedoms exist, but most instruments of democracy are in a bad state of affairs and with some few exceptions –

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[24] http://www.afrobarometer.org/AfropaperNo44.pdf, for instance, is thus far only registering identities in addition to the national identity, seemingly taking the latter as given. In Europe, moreover, a major preoccupation seems to be the identities of various minorities, concluding for instance that the national identity tends to be strongly related to country of birth. One early and partially interesting comparison may be made, however, with results from a survey conducted in South Africa by Dr. Liv Tørres. In 1994, 80% of the urban black population in South Africa identified themselves as South-Africans.

primarily the technically free and fair elections – there have been no major improvements.

There is no doubt a dangerous democratic deficit of the most essential rights and institutions in Indonesia's new Post-Soeharto polity.

What are the implications? At this point it is only possible to make general recommendations.

5.3.1 There is a tendency to appropriate critical analysis of Indonesia's democracy in order to argue that since it does not 'deliver', it is not good for the country. Our survey proves this to be an invalid argument that should be disposed of. Given that most of the essential instruments of democracy do not function well, one cannot accuse democracy of not delivering.

5.3.2 We must stop talking about democracy in general terms. The defence as well as critique of Indonesian democracy must be more nuanced. Some rights and institutions are doing quite well. They must be defended and improved – neither belittled nor used to overshadow the more fundamental problems.

5.3.4 The disturbingly poor correspondence between the officially delineated *demos* and how people identify themselves in public matters must be acknowledged as a problem of a formerly unifying nation state project – not only in Aceh and Papua – but it does not signal the balkanisation of the new democratic polity, the problems and options of which, according to the survey, seem to be remarkably similar around the country.

5.3.5 The special problem of Indonesia's insufficient independence seems to call for more emphasis on the importance of the debt-trap, transnational business and related agencies than of central control of people and international solidarity as with post-tsunami Aceh.

5.3.6 It is clear that the overall strategy for crafting new rights and institutions to promote democracy has failed. Most of the performance and scope of the instruments is poor and rarely seen to improve. The idea that the crafting of 'good' institutions will bring democracy is not sufficient. We have to focus on why this is and what needs to be done order to address the deeper roots of the problem.

5.3.7 More clear-cut proposals require information about what rights and institutions are most strategic and what actors have the will and capacity to improve conditions. We shall return to them in the following conclusions.

6. Conclusion II: Elections, but Not Representation

The instruments of democracy in Indonesia are, thus, dual. On the one hand there are ten rights and institutions that more than 50% of the informants characterise as doing reasonably well (even if some are on the brink) – and on the other hand there are twenty-five instruments that more than 50% say are poor or very poor. To advance in a constructive way, we need detailed analysis of what distinguishes these two groups of institutions, what the major problems are and what the priority options should be.

The top-ten list comprises of three groups of instruments:
1. All the civil and political rights aside from those related to 'freedom from physical violence and the fear from it'
2. All instruments to promote civil society aside from 'transparency, accountability and democracy within civic organisations' and
3. 'Free and fair elections' plus 'freedom to form political parties…'

In other words, we have reasonable civic freedoms and elections but not everything else that is part and parcel of democracy.

6.1 Of all the poor instruments, which are the most serious ?

What are the most severe problems in the long list of more or less defunct instruments of democracy? There are three major tendencies:
1. The most severe problems are related to instruments that are meant to promote
   - Rule of law
   - Democratic representation
   - Accountable government (including decentralisation)
2. There are also some serious problems with social and economic rights
3. The most serious of the rest relate to poor channels of direct participation, problems of violence and fear and of citizenship.

These results lend partial support to several arguments that have been put forward in the discourse on what constitute the main problems of Indonesian democracy:

First, the thesis that defunct law and order is the worst;

Second, the opinion that we should focus on the lack of 'good governance', including corruption;

Third, the view that no democracy will work unless there are basic social and economic rights and freedom from violence.

There is much to these arguments – but they suffer from two common problems. One, there is little knowledge on how these problems relate to one another. For instance, we do not know if improved rule of law will also improve social and economic rights. In addition, even if such a relationship exists, nothing is said about how such changes might be achieved in a democratic way. In fact, it is a common argument that improvements in

the rule of law or the elimination of corruption for instance, calls for so-called enlightened strong leadership *a la* Singapore.

6.2. The main institutional obstacle to democracy

Our conclusion is instead that defunct representation is both the most serious and most strategic obstacle to democracy in Indonesia. There are two reasons for this. First, improved representation is the only way in which all the other deficiencies of democracy that we have pointed to might be addressed in a democratic way. Second, it is true that the freedom to form political parties seems to be real and widespread and elections were comparatively free and fair, but all the other instruments that should promote democratic representation are very poor, including genuinely democratic political parties that actually represent people's ideas, interests and aspirations, both during the elections and in between. If we include instruments that should favour direct participation, the situation becomes even worse.

The main difference between the informants is that those working on or related to mass oriented movements, such as those of peasants, labour and urban poor, as well as issues of anti-corruption, are more critical than others with regard to performance though not always with respect to scope. Of the few regional differences one may note that political parties' ability to form and run government and money politics are deemed as being somewhat less critical in Kalimantan than elsewhere.

Table 6.2.1 The main problems of representation and direct participation[25]

No.	Rights and institutions	poor performance	poor scope
1.	Political parties' independence of money politics and powerful vested interests	91%	69%
2.	Membership control of political parties, and parties responsiveness and accountability to their constituencies	84%	71%
3.	People's direct contact with political representatives and the public services and servants	82%	70%
4.	Political parties' reflection of critical issues and interests among people	81%	70%
5.	Political parties' ability to form and run government	81%	70%
6.	Government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policymaking and the execution of public decisions.	75%	73%
7.	(22) Political parties abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines	66%	58%

Moreover, the situation does not seem to improve. Informants particularly among parties and those trying to broaden mass movements favour local representation and promoting gender issues may be somewhat less critical, but in general the instruments related to representation score highest among those that have deteriorated since 1999. The problems

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[25] The figures refer to the proportion of informants who say that the rights and institutions have poor performance and poor scope.

of parties ability to form and run government seems to be most serious in Java-Bali, while money politics is deemed somewhat less problematic in Kalimantan.

Table 6.2.2 Rights and institutions that related to representation which informants say have deteriorated since 1999.

No.	Rights and institutions	Performance	Scope
1.	Parties independence of money politics and powerful vested interests	43%	37%
2.	Parties ability to form and run government	30%	24%

Most disturbingly, the instruments of representation are prominent among those which the informants say make least sense to use and promote, and which they, therefore, try to find alternatives to.

Table 6.2.3 Rights and institutions related to representation which informants say make least sense to use and promote and the proportion of informants even trying to find alternatives.

No.	Rights and institutions	both use and improve	find alternative
1.	Parties ability to form and run government	30%	19%
2.	Members control of parties, and parties responsiveness and accountability to constituencies	33%	21%
3.	Parties abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines	33%	19%
4.	Parties independence of money politics and powerful vested interests	35%	24%
5.	People's direct contact with political representatives + the public services and servants	37%	15%
6.	Parties reflection of vital issues and interests among people	38%	18%
7.	Freedom to form parties, recruit members, and campaign for office	42%	13%

In other words, it is not only that the instruments to promote representation do not work well – many committed democrats even try to avoid them and seek alternatives to the main democratic pathways towards improving democracy.

6.3 Conclusions and recommendations: review and promotion of representation.

In short, the fledgling democracy can not be improved democratically since good and dynamic representation of people's ideas and interests is missing. There are several liberal rights and free and fair elections – but without representation. On the level of rights and institutions, this is the real crisis of Indonesia's further democratisation.

What should be done?

6.3.1 The most important general recommendation is to give more attention to the promotion of the basic dimensions of political representation beyond reasonably well functioning elections and the freedom to form political parties. Such instruments relate primarily to political parties and the way in which they work:

→ Political parties' reflection of vital issues and interests among people
→ Political parties' abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines
→ Political parties' independence of money politics and powerful vested interests
→ Membership control of parties, and parties responsiveness and accountability to their constituencies
→ Political parties' ability to form and run government

But we may also include interest-based representation through organisations such as trade unions, for instance:

→ Freedom to carry out trade union and similar activities and more direct forms of representation.

Finally we may add direct forms of representation:
→ People's direct contact with the public services and servants
→ People's direct contact with their political representatives
→ Government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policymaking and the execution of public decisions.

6.3.2 The existence of democratic, representative and responsive political parties and unions, in turn, presupposes (among other things) favourable rules and regulations. Demands should be made for parliament to initiate a detailed public, scholarly and non-partisan study to review the existing and possible future rules and regulations with the clearly formulated aim of promoting the development of democratic, representative and responsive political parties and unions. If this task is not undertaken, a similar public study should be initiated by committed politicians, intellectuals and activists.

6.3.3 The rules and regulations to be reviewed with regard to political parties (and unions where applicable) should include:

1. What forms of elections – at both central and local level – would promote the development of better representation.

   Our survey as well as the experiences from the Philippines, for instance, indicate that personality oriented elections in one-person constituencies is *not* the best solution but that one should rather promote the development of better political parties. To promote the growth of such parties from below, one may also consider altering the rules to allow for the participation of local parties in local elections, and to promote coalitions of local parties in national elections.

2. What rules and regulations might realistically prevent the abuse of various instruments of representation.

   Participation in elections, public funding and access to public service oriented media, for instance, may be limited to parties with reasonably well applied internal democracy, public accounting of finances, and commitment to human

rights. Another example may be pro-democracy oriented revisions of the curriculum in public schools and universities.

3. What public measures might realistically prevent the monopolisation of the supposedly democratic rights and institutions whilst supporting actors who wish to improve the instruments of representation.

These types of recommendations presuppose further studies of the dominant as well as pro-democratic actors. We shall turn to this in our third and fourth general conclusions.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

In reality, the problem of political representation is even more serious than has been indicated above. As we shall see in the following sections, the issues of rule of law, corruption, violence and basic needs are highly contested areas. The hegemony of the dominant actors is disputed. Citizens try to resist, protest, and organise. Instruments of political representation, however, have been almost entirely monopolised by the elite. Potential actors of change (and the pro-democrats in particular) have in the main confined themselves to working with other sectors and instruments, primarily within civil society. The 1999 and 2004 general elections are probably the best case in point: they were technically free and fair, and in principle it was possible for anyone to form a party and attempt to qualify for the race – but aside from elements of the semi-sectarian PKS there was hardly any representation from those groups and ambitions that reintroduced democracy in 1998.

7. Conclusion III: Oligarchic-Democracy

What is the relationship between the poor standard of the instruments of democracy and the will and capacity of the citizens to make use of them? In this section that focuses on the third main conclusion we shall discuss the dominant actors.[26] In the following section, that focuses on the fourth main conclusion, we shall then turn to the democracy-activists.[27]

7.1. Instruments of democracy not avoided but monopolised and abused

In the international discourse on democracy, one of the main problems facing new democracies (that have emerged in the wake of the transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin America in the late 1970s and 80s) is that the dominant actors simply ignore or veto the instruments of democracy. The background to these transitions is the great emphasis on elitist crafting of pacts and institutions. The fundamental idea is that international pressure could facilitate a compromise whereby popular forces would be contained, while authoritarian capitalists, bureaucrats and officers would be able to retain their assets – based on the assumption that they would accept the crafting of institutions in favour of human rights, 'good governance', free and fair elections and an independent civil society. Those institutions, in turn, would then shape liberal democracy.

The increasingly common critical argument however, is that even when the previously politically as well as economically dominant actors (such as the upper echelons of the New Order elite) have given up their formal political positions and agreed to free and fair elections and some liberal rights, holding on to their assets enables them to avoid and undermine most of the new instruments of democracy. Many crucial decisions are instead being made within the increasingly privatised and globalised economy as well as the similarly informalised public institutions. For instance, within company boardrooms, the IMF, private security guards, sub-contracted healthcare systems, at the Rotary Club or simply by networking and lobbying.

To get an idea of the extent to which democracy has been consolidated, it has thus been relevant to apply the Linz and Stepan (1996) test of asking if democracy has really become the 'only game in town'. It is true that a substantial majority of our informants say that the polity as a whole is not independent enough of foreign powers, including international business and the IMF, and that the problem is increasing.[28] This cannot be ignored. It may well be that some of the limited performance and scope of the rights and

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[26] Who are the dominant actors? The informants were requested to identify and analyse the three most powerful actors in the informants' contexts. About 40% were local or central public executives or related to such organs. Another 16% were from the police, military, militias and hoodlums. Yet another 17% were related to parliaments or parties while only some 12% were related to business and dominant actors' NGOs.

[27] At the time of writing, no reliable specifications for regions and issue-areas were available with regard to the dominant actors since the combination of first and second round data had not yet been completed.

[28] Eighty-three percent of the informants say that the performance is poor; 69% say that the scope is insufficient; 36% and 31% respectively say that the situation has deteriorated since 1999.

institutions are related to this subordination. But as far as the actors are concerned, and as far as our informants have deemed actors with transnational contacts to be dominant, it remains a fact that most of them make their way through ordinary politics and state apparatus. Thus our survey largely proves the Lintz and Stepan test to be invalid in the world's third largest fledgling democracy. The Lintz and Stepan test does not reveal any major problems since the dominant actors tend to play the game, yet we know from the results of the survey that they bend and abuse the rules and that most of the instruments of democracy are in a bad way. Let us look at this in somewhat more detail.

As has already been indicated, even our critical and not very establishment oriented informants agree that the bypassing of the new and supposedly democratic rights and institutions has not been the main strategy of the dominant actors (who are on the whole 'survivors' of the Soeharto period). It is true that only 14% are deemed to both promote *and* use the rights and institutions, but at the same time only another 14% seek to avoid them altogether. A huge majority 'use' or at the very least, 'use and abuse' the purportedly democratic institutions. This is also confirmed by the figures that relate to the main strategies opted for in order to engage with and make use of the political system. Fewer than 10% of the dominant actors prioritise the bypassing of the system. A clear majority work their way through the legal and legislative system. Fifteen percent also anchor their work in civil society.

Table 7.1.1. Selected indicators of dominant actors' adherence to the supposedly democratic rights and institutions.[29]

● **Dominant actor's relation to the rights & institutions**	use and promote	use	use and abuse	abuse/bypass	
	14%	29%	32%	14%	
● **Dominant actors' strategy within the political system**	via legislative related paths	via judicial sector only	via judicial & civil society sectors	via civil society only	bypassing the system
	63%	13%	6%	13%	(8%) in 2nd round
● **Dominant actors' transformation of power (2nd round only; similar trend in 1st round)**	via legislative, judicial and executive inst.	use public budget and regulations	authoritarian measures	buy support	Ethnicity and religion
	(15%)	(10%)	(16%)	(13%)	(8%)

Another clear signal is that the principal way in which the dominant actors try to transform their 'raw' power into legitimacy, authority and political influence is through

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[29] The category 'legislative related paths' include 'taking issues directly to the political organs', 'taking issues directly to both judicial and political organs', 'taking issues to the political organs via civil society' and 'taking issues to both judicial and political organs via civil society'. The category 'authoritarian measures' the use of either state or private coercive instruments, from for instance forceful authorities and military to militias. 'Buy support' includes 'simply buying legitimacy and support' and the more general 'money politics'.

their presence in the judicial, legislative and executive organs of the state and related authoritarian methods, rather than, for instance, buying their way in positions of authority or drawing on ethnic and religious sentiment.[30]

According to mainstream perception, Indonesian democracy should thus be doing very well – in-spite of the fact that almost everything else in our survey points to a different conclusion. Most of the instruments of democracy have a very low rate of performance and scope. The poor standard of the key elements of representation is particularly worrying. The institutions in favour of rule of law and 'good governance' are also defunct, in spite of often being prioritised by the elite. Corruption and money politics for example actually seem to have increased since 1999. There are strong indications that the dominant actors who have adjusted to the new polity still do so with the aim of appropriating and making use of public resources for their own ends, including within the context of a decentralised administration.

Although the dominant actors are willing to play the new democratic game, they do so by bending and altering the rules. The main problem is not the bypassing of the instruments that are supposed to favour democracy – but that they have been hijacked and monopolised. This cannot but be described as an 'oligarchic democracy'.

It is not appropriate therefore, to blame democracy *per se* for Indonesia's current problems, including those of corruption or poor economic growth. Just as the idea of a market economy is not invalidated by the drawbacks of monopolisation, democracy is not invalidated by the negative effects of dominant actors that have succeeded in monopolising its major instruments.

7.2 The dynamics of monopolisation

In order to successfully redress this problem, it is not sufficient to brand it as a 'bastard' rather than 'real' democracy. Instead, we need to explore further in order to know the character and dynamics of the monopolisation of democracy. The results of the survey lend support to three critical arguments.

First, Indonesian society is still very much characterised by the symbiotic relationship between advanced and primitive accumulation of capital by way of non-economic, often political and essentially coercive instruments of power that were first introduced through indirect colonial rule.

This observation is supported by the type of dominant actors that our informants have identified. (The informants were asked to identify and analyse the three most powerful actors in their respective contexts.) Some 40% were local or national level public executives or related to such bodies. Another 16% come from the police, military, militias and hoodlums. Yet another 17% were related to parliament (local or national) and political parties while only some 12% were related to business and NGOs founded by dominant actors.

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[30] Exact figures are only available for round two, but the trend was the same in round one.

It is true, moreover, that the dominant actors' most important sources of power are economic. In the second round of the survey, some 37 % tend to primarily rely on their economic strength. Yet, at least 19% based their power on outright access to public resources, with 3% using access to foreign aid. Actually, 'real business' as a source of power comes in at only 13%. Further, some 28 % rely at first hand on non-economic sources of power (through control of the judiciary, bureaucracy, police, military, militia and hoodlums). In addition, about 25 % seem to mainly draw on social capital in terms of close networks and good connections, while only 7 % fall back on cultural sources of power such as knowledge and access to information. The combined figures from both the first and second rounds of the survey of the frequency of different sources of power (as against the source given top priority to) speak much the same language but indicate also the importance of combining different sources, especially the significance of adding good networks and connections to the more fundamental economic sources.

The same trend is indicated by the presence of the dominant actors in various spheres and arenas within the political landscape as a whole. While the majority, some 34%, are primarily based within or in close relation to the state, and as many as 25% are rooted in self-managed units (such as cooperatives and community organisations), *circa* 23% are based in various organisations in the public sphere, and only 18% in business.

It is true that the predominant new form of alliance between dominant actors post 1999 is with business people (26%), but taken together those with politicians (14%), political parties (8%), legislative bodies and officials within public administration (16%) are even more important. It is interesting to note however that alliances involving military personnel are low at only 4%. This is further underlined by the marked tendency to legitimise 'raw' power by relying on legislative, judicial and executive (state) agencies – some 25% and the demonstration of repressive powers – about 16% – while economic oriented activities score low at about 13%.[31] A similar tendency is reflected in how the dominant actors' tend to work their way through the political system. As has already been indicated, the option to bypass the system is not the first choice, preferring to precede instead via the legislative system (63%) (with or without combinations) or directly through judicial bodies or civil society (25%).

Second, the same data indicates that the conventional picture of the Soeharto-era centralised dominant actors is invalidated. For instance, as we have seen, the dominant actors are not only occupying various agencies of the state and to some extent business, but almost one fourth (25%) relate primarily to self-managed units and about as many (23%) to the public sphere. Direct civil society activity as a strategy within the political system, moreover, is not only an option for the pro-democracy activists but is also a priority for some 15% of the dominant actors. And while decentralisation has provided more space for pro-democrats, it has also (as our data on the new opportunity structure suggest) turned into an arena for dominant actors including, it seems, centrally-based actors 'returning home'.

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[31] The figures are from round two only. The consolidation of data has not yet been completed. The general tendency, however, was the same in round one.

Third, it is true that the political capacity of the dominant actors is based on conventional politicisation of single issues (a priority of 47% of the actors) rather than comprehensive agendas and programmes (only about 18%). And the primary means for the mass mobilisation is through populism, clientelism or alternative patronage (which is the priority for 49% of the actors) rather than integration from below. In this context moreover, it is interesting to note that only 11% of the actors give priority to religious, ethnic and other communitarian values.[32] Mass mobilisation is also attained through networking (15%) and various forms of more institutionalised organisations (33%), almost half of which are in the form of political machines. This testifies to the rather solidly based and broadly anchored political capacity of the dominant actors. Any strategy on the part of pro-democrats which assumes that the dominant actors are not broadly rooted and are in fact isolated at the top is doomed to failure.

7.3 Conclusions and recommendations: de-monopolise the instruments of democracy

In short, most of the critical instruments of democracy are defunct. The problems of corruption, economic growth, disorganised decentralisation and the rule of law, to name a few, exist not because of the failure of democracy *per se*, but because critical rights and institutions are in sorry state of affairs, added to which is the reality that most people are lacking in the capacity to use and promote them. In Indonesia, in contrast to many other new democracies, this is not in the first instance due to the dominant actors' avoidance of the rights and institutions, but rather because they monopolise, bend and abuse them. This is what we mean by an oligarchic democracy.

7.3.1 Any attempt to salvage and further develop democracy presupposes the need to stop blaming the concept of democracy itself for what the dominant actors have done to it.

7.3.2 One of the fundamental assumptions of the 'crafting-of-democracy-paradigm', which has been exported wholesale to Indonesia (c.f. Liddle 2001), is that the trick in promoting a reasonably functioning democracy is to get the moderate elite to accept democracy as 'the only game in town'. Since our survey demonstrate that this is exactly what the elite do, but that nevertheless most of the instruments of democracy are being monopolised, bended and abused by the dominant elite, and thus remain defunct, the basic tenets of the paradigm have been invalidated and should be set aside.

7.3.3 Any attempt to improve the situation must be based on the assumption that while it is not necessary for all the dominant actors to benefit from a defunct democracy, our survey indicates that their vested interests have prevented any real improvements. Substantial improvements, therefore, require the de-monopolisation of the instruments of democracy.

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[32] See the previous footnote.

In order to address this connection between the playing of the game and the bending and abusing of the rules, we need to understand how this state of affairs has come to pass. Our survey lends support to the general argument that the dynamics of the monopolisation of democracy are rooted in the colonial symbiosis between advanced capitalism and primitive accumulation of capital, usually by way of state and politics.

7.3.4 Any strategy aimed at successfully challenging this symbiosis cannot be based therefore on neo-liberal or statist solutions as both of these approaches are actually part of the problem. This is evident from Indonesia's own history of Sukarno's and the armed forces' 'guided democracy' and Soeharto's despotic liberalism. Enlightened businessmen, for instance, who are concerned about the lack of appropriate business law and rampart corruption will realise that since no substantial change will come about with the dominant actors in sole command, there is a need for harnessing enormous pressure which is beyond their own individual capacities, as well as alternative agendas based on popular rooted forces of change in favour of the introduction *and* implementation of enhanced instruments of democracy.

In view of international experiences – most recently in Latin American countries such as Brazil – the only realistic and fruitful ideas point in the direction of *democratically regulated* de-monopolisation, beyond neo-liberalism and statism. This presupposes the backing of democratically facilitated pacts on central and local levels between growth-oriented business, professional oriented middle classes in state and private sectors, and organised labouring people in formal as well as informal sectors, in return for improved standard of living. This is easier said than done, but given the current nexus between state and business there must be an enhanced focus on the prerequisites for such an agenda.

There are firm indications in the survey that the dominant actors are socially and politically well anchored. They do not constitute an isolated elite teetering on the top of the state that can be 'surrounded' and confined by civil society. For one, the elite are also active in civil society. The dominant actors do not rise and fall, therefore, along with top-driven parties and political machinery that it might be possible to undermine through personality oriented elections in one person constituencies. The dominant actors have much broader bases and are more than capable of rallying behind or transforming themselves into the election-winning bosses that are prevalent in the Philippines and Thailand.

7.3.5 Studies, discussions *and* concrete experiments must thus focus on renewed or alternative organising and agenda-setting beyond the problems of top-driven parties, personality oriented direct elections and scattered civil society activism. One possible entry point may be new experiences from the forthcoming series of local direct elections. Another is through international comparisons and yet another is by analysing the problems facing and options available to the committed democrats – both of which we shall now be discussed in the fourth main conclusion.

8. Conclusion IV: Floating and Marginalised Agents of Change – with New Ambitions

Given the many defunct instruments of democracy and the dubious democratic character of the elite, it is reasonable to ask if and how the genuine actors that brought democratisation to Indonesia in 1998 might resurrect the process.

It is apparent from our previous case studies of the movement (Prasetyo, Priyono and Törnquist 2003), that much crucial and important work is taking place, especially within civil society and amongst various pressure and lobbying groups. But it is also quite clear that the activists continued to suffer from their isolation during the Soeharto period from basic public interests and the opportunities for contributing to mass organising, thus reflecting Soeharto's 'floating mass politics'.[33] Directly after the movement had played a decisive role in overthrowing the Soeharto regime moreover, it was mainly confined to work in civil society, outside of organised politics. This was in part the explicit aim of the predominant transition paradigm that emphasised pacts between moderate sections of the elite and local supplementary citizen self-management and associational life. But it was also the result of the 'floating' and disparate nature of the movement itself, and of its inability to overcome this reality. One of the rationales for the current survey is to see if and how the preliminary results from the previous case-studies can be generalised and qualified, to identify what options are available and to spotlight any existing initiatives that show promise.

So what are the general results of the survey? On the one hand the picture obtained from previous research is largely confirmed. The potential agents of change remain for the most part floating and marginalised. On the other hand, there are indications of emerging options, increasing awareness of the problems and new ambitions to search for viable alternatives.

Maybe the initial stumbling block of the movement does not lie in the difficulties as such, but rather with the inconclusive ideas of the root causes and viable remedies (based on anecdotal evidence such as our own case studies) and the problematic identification of options in the midst of all the challenges.

The results of the survey are more comprehensive and clear-cut. These fall into three broad categories which shall be addressed one by one:
1. The not so self-evident interest in democracy
2. The actual and potential social base and
3. The dilemmas of politicisation and representation.

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[33] This prevented political organising (aside from that of Golkar) at the grass roots level.

8.1 When democracy makes sense

Previous results indicated that the existing instruments of democracy were so poor and irrelevant that they did not make much sense even to hard pressed people. At times, therefore, hard pressed peasants trying to reclaim the land for instance, might resort to burning down a police station rather than trying in vain to work their way through the new polity. Our survey has invalidated this sweeping statement.[34] According to our informants, the main tendency amongst democracy-oriented groups and organisations is not just to talk about democracy but also to try to both 'use and promote' (45%) the various existing rights and institutions This is in sharp contrast to the elite (14%).

There are few significant regional differences, but informants from issue areas related to urban poor, anti-corruption, human rights and attempts to reform political parties tend to demonstrate greater motivation to both use *and* promote democracy than the average, whilst those related to professionalism, gender, the broadening of mass movements and political party building give significantly lower rates.

In spite of the general commitment to promote *and* use democracy, there is also the understandable but problematic tendency to 'walk the primrose path' and avoid the tricky but crucial problems. While the pro-democrats tend to promote and use the instruments with reasonable performance and scope in relation to which they already have a reasonably strong position, they are far less interested in the instruments with poor performance and scope where they are in a weak position; and at times they even try to find alternatives. (Some of the few differences between the regions and the more important variations between issue areas have already been reported in relation to the first conclusion.) The picture is sharp and the correlation is almost perfect:

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[34] Probably formulated most drastically in Törnquist (2001 and 2002) but also mentioned in Prasetyo, Priyono and Törnquist (2003)

Table 8.1.1. **Proportion of informants stating that democracy-oriented activists both use and improve the existing instruments of democracy and/or search for alternatives; plus the proportion of informants stating that the activists are either strong or weak in relation to the instruments.** [35]

	Proportion of informants who say:	use and improve	find alternatives	strength of position
	Less than 50%			
1.	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	28%	27%	weak
2.	Political parties' ability to form and run government	30%	19%	weak
3.	The independence of the government from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	30%	19%	weak
4.	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	32%	24%	weak
5.	Membership control of political parties, and parties' responsiveness and accountability to their constituencies	33%	21%	weak
6.	Political parties' abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines	33%	19%	weak
7.	Good corporate governance and business regulations in the public interest	33%	17%	weak
8.	Political parties' independence from money politics and powerful vested interests	35%	24%	weak
9.	People's direct contact with political representatives and the public services and servants	37%	15%	weak
10.	Political parties' reflection of vital issues and interests among people	38%	18%	weak
11.	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	39%	19%	weak
12.	Government support and respect for international law and UN human rights treaties	41%	11%	weak
13.	Freedom to form political parties, recruit members, and campaign for office	42%	13%	+/-
14.	The transparency and accountability of the executive/public civil servants, on all levels	43%	13%	weak
15.	Government's independence of strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	44%	18%	weak
16.	The transparency and accountability of elected government, on all levels	44%	13%	weak
17.	Equal and secure access to justice and the integrity and independence of the judiciary	45%	15%	weak
18.	Democratic decentralisation of government on the basis of the subsidiarity principle	45%	12%	weak
19.	Freedom to carry out trade union activities	45%	(9%)	+/-
20.	The rights of children	45%	(9%)	weak
21.	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	46%	13%	weak
22.	The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees and reconciliation of horizontal conflicts	46%	12%	weak
23.	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	45%	10%	weak
24.	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	47%	11%	weak
25.	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	48%		+/-
26.	Government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policymaking and the execution of public decisions.	49%	13%	weak

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[35] Data below 9% in column two has been left out.

	More than 50 %			
1.	Freedom of religion and belief plus language and culture	50%		strong
2.	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civic organisations	52%	10%	strong
3.	Equal citizenship	53%	(9%)	+/-
4.	Free and fair general elections	52%	(9%)	strong
5.	All social groups' – including women's – extensive access to and participation in public life	56%		+/-
6.	Gender equality and emancipation	57%		+/-
7.	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	57%		strong
8.	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civic associations	63%		strong
9.	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	70%		strong

In the first place, this is of course a strong indication of the problematic standard of certain instruments of democracy. But it also signals the degree to which the pro-democrats themselves are interested in and able to make a difference. The broad pattern then, is that with few exceptions the pro-democrats are interested in liberal freedoms, certain social and economic rights, civil society and participation, but pay far less attention to the rule of law and especially governance and representation. Thus, the crucial problems of democracy are set aside.

The pathways of the pro-democrats within the political system are another illustration of the same tendency. Direct democracy in civil society is by far the most popular route at more than 30%. Together with the option of adding the judicial system (12%) and turning straight to lawyers and the courts (13%), the direct paths are in clear majority as compared to those avenues which in some way involve governance and representation either directly or via civil society. The comprehensive strategy of society-based democratic rule of law by using civil society in combination with both the judicial and political bodies only accounts for 8%. If we examine the priorities given the picture is even sharper. We shall return to this, but it is clear that the democracy movement is not well equipped to solve the problems of representation.

However, there are openings and opportunities. Informants from the less action-oriented issue areas established after the fall of Soeharto seem to be less anti-state oriented. This is reflected for example in their comments on the pros and cons of relating to various rights and institutions. Moreover, informants' comments on the opportunity structure, as well as on the pro-democrats' values and perspectives in addition to their attempts to transform power into legitimacy and authority, often indicate emerging interests within local government and elections. This in turn places a series of new challenges on the agenda, such as the need to address issues of governance and representation beyond NGO- or action group-based lobbying, as well as sufficiently broad social and political bases.

8.2 Floating but potentially dynamic base

Our informants have been thoroughly selected from experienced and reflective pro-democracy activists. Their composition, therefore, also gives some indication of the basic

capacity of the movement to promote and use democracy. To begin with, the leading campaigners still seem to be confined to the NGOs rather than to broad political and interest-based organisations, and to the middle-class rather than to broader sections of the population. NGO activists (and social workers) constitute some 28% of our informants; yet only 14% of those have roots in fishing, agriculture and manual labour, while the rest all seem to have middle-class professional backgrounds.

According to these informants, the main sources of power amongst the campaigners and their attempts to transform them into legitimacy and authority resemble what one would expect to be the case in a post-industrial society (rather than a developing country): the primary sources seem to be access to knowledge and information, and the main way of gaining influence seems to be through discursive activities in the public sphere. In contrast, seeking the mandate of the people and working through political and administrative representation score very low.

Table 8.2.1. Major methods of transforming sources of power into legitimacy, authority and political influence amongst pro-democracy actors.[36]

No.	Method	instances	1st priority
1.	By providing correct information, analysis, awareness etc. through public discourse	17%	42%
2.	By providing networks and co-ordination	13%	11%
3.	By having good lobbying and pressure groups etc.	10%	6%
4.	By help building good interest based and/or political mass oriented movements	9%	6%
5.	By providing contacts and engaging in dialogues with politicians, administrators et. al	9%	3%
6.	By providing contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts	7%	2%
7.	By being committed, courageous and consistent	7%	9%
8.	By providing solidarity with or between vulnerable groups	7%	3%
9.	By being able to demonstrate collective mass based strength	6%	6%
10.	By seeking the mandate of people, getting elected or appointed to official positions	2%	1%
11.	To work by way of political and administrative representatives	2%	0%
12.	Other methods	11%	11%

At the same time however, one should not ignore attempts at gaining legitimacy and authority which reveal more engagement in broader collective action. In fact, 15% of the responses relate to the promotion of interests and/or political mass oriented movements and the demonstration of collective power. Moreover, there are already indications of NGOs trying to broaden their base by servicing new emerging popular organisations in a way that may generate powerful combinations.

In a similar vain, the composition of our informants reveals the marginalisation of women and their experiences in the leading positions of the democracy movement. Only 17% of the informants are women. A remarkable figure. Most probably women's perspectives are

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[36] Detailed data is at present only available from the 2nd round of the survey but largely confirm the trends in the first round.

also thereby set aside. Ironically however, this is not a wholly negative finding. Given all the comparative international experience, it also signals huge unexplored potential for the movement. Should the movement manage to decisively integrate the experiences and thus grounded perspectives of reflective women – which tend to be pro-democracy oriented – it would greatly and probably rather swiftly widen the base and enhance the capacity of the movement.

A more comprehensive indication of the limited foundations of the democracy movement is its poor presence in critical spheres of the political landscape. Bluntly speaking, the democracy movement seems to be confined to spaces outside the roots of the state-business nexus of the dominant actors. There is hardly any presence within business, including small scale business, or in relation to it. This figure stands at only 12%. The organisation of various producers and workplace oriented activities, for instance, seem to be highly unusual. Strangely enough, this figure is not decisively higher amongst informants working on labour issues.

The informants from the labour sector are to an remarkably high degree focusing on state-society relations, presumably related to a prioritisation of labour laws and public measures, seemingly at the expense of shop floor issues.[37] Presence within the state apparatus is also minuscule (11%). The primary base of the pro-democrats is to be found amongst local self-managed units such as community organisation and co-operatives (33%), and groups and organisations within the public sphere (28%). And supplementary information reveals continuous problems of co-ordinating activities at both central and local levels.

Table 8.2.2. The pro-democrats in the political landscape

Spheres		Instances	
-State			23%
	In relation to elected bodies	12%	
	Administration	7%	
	Military, police	4%	
-Business (big/medium/small)		12%	12%
-Self-managed units			34%
	Religious	7%	
	Community	11%	
	Non-profit organisations including cooperatives, media, education	15%	
-Public sphere			28%
	Society-state relations	14%	
	Society-business relations	5%	
	Society- self-managed unit relations	9%	
-Other		4%	3%
TOTAL		**100%**	**100%**

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[37] This is the only essential difference obtained from the general picture: while the general trend for work in the public sphere regarding state-society relations is about 14% and business-society relations is 6%, informants from the labour sector say 35% and 5% respectively. Some of this may be due to a misunderstanding of the question (such as insecurity as to whether the 'society-business' category really included trade union activity related to companies or not) but it hardly explains the major difference.

There are however also some emerging options. For example, one is frequently told of highly ambitious initiatives that aim to prioritise links between central and local levels, giving more priority to the local in contrast to previous centralism. In fact, the increasingly widespread awareness of the need to ground the 'floating' democracy movement in firm local bases may even give rise to the opposite problem, namely of fragmented and communitarian-oriented localism, of which there are already some indications in the informants' comments on policies and formative values and perspectives.

Comparisons with the more open ended questions in the survey also reveal emerging activities amongst public servants (that include the historically important teachers) as well as more close preoccupation with the elected bodies of the state (12%), particularly at the local level

Finally, the combination of, on the one hand, improved presence in relation to production, the workplace and the state, and on the other, sustained bases in self managed units and the public sphere may well be of unique advantage when facing two of the fundamental challenges that have already been discussed: to ground new attempts at reforming or generating new political vehicles and to find supplementary popular entry-points for going beyond the dead-end neo-liberal and statist attacks on the roots of the dominant actors' symbiotic economic and political power.

8.3 Representation beyond scattered politicisation of issues and people

The relevance of the democracy movement hinges on its capacity to fight the crisis of representation, previously analysed in conclusion II. The immediate situation looks bleak. There are three key factors:
1. The articulation of issues and interests
2. The mobilisation and organisation of people and
3. The question of direct and/or indirect democracy.

(1) First, people must have the capacity to turn those experiences, grievances, ideas and interests that they believe relate to matters of common concern into broadly defined politics. Democracy does not work if citizens themselves are unable to transform their own individual and private or small group concerns into public ones, and are forced to subordinate themselves to somebody else doing this 'for them'. In short, citizens themselves must be able to politicise their publicly relevant concerns.

The various issues, interests and policies that are generated in this process are crucial and must be recorded. Yet, as outlined in the introduction to this report, we are only interested in policies that have a bearing on the infrastructure of democracy, and not in partisan policies that exist within such a framework. Our previous results suggest then, that it is the character of politicisation rather than what is politicised - the content - that is crucial to people's democratic capacity.

The pro-democrats tend to either politicise single issues and specific interests of various kinds *or* very general ideas and values. Neither is favourable to democratic representation. The first case is based on concrete problems and the second is not. But the first nourishes fragmentation whilst the second is too sweeping. Broader issues, general agendas and perceptions of how a variety of concrete ideas and interests may be related to one another through governance agendas are not prioritised. In fact, the figures for the pro-democracy actors are not much more impressive than those for the dominant actors.

Table 8.3.1. Proportion of informants statements as to what type of politicisation is dominant amongst pro-democracy actors and what they prioritise. (Figures in brackets are from the 2nd round only)

Policy character		instances	1st priority
Single issues and specific interests		*42%*	*50%*
	special issues/interests	(34%)	(44%)
	many special issues/interests	(35%)	(33%)
	rallying point-issues	(31%)	(23%)
		(100%)	(100%)
Comprehensive issues/ interests (agendas)		*18%*	*6%*
General ideas		*39%*	*44%*
	universal (e.g. human rights)	(50%)	(47%)
	empirically based ideology	(19%)	(17%)
	religious	(11%)	(12%)
	communitarian	(20%)	(25%)
		(100%)	(100%)
TOTAL		**100%**	**100%**

This tendency may be explained by the floating and (for a long period of time) non-political nature of the movement. Yet it is strange that so little seems to have been achieved since the struggle against the Soeharto regime first intensified in the early 1990s.

In the first round of the study, there were signs of a possibly emerging exception. The potential for the relation of individual cases of land rights, indigenous rights, social and economic rights, environmental problems and associated cases of human rights abuses to renewed interest in sustainable and participatory development was discernable. These include self-management of economic and social life, collective/community resource management as well as demands for improved public services in the face of privatisation and isolated ideas of participatory budgeting. This, we suggested, might be further developed as the basis for a common 'green' (or sustainable development oriented) left-of-centre agenda.

There were no signs of a similar tendency associated with the broader kind of labour movement agenda, with or without links to liberal middle class concerns, that have generated new opportunities in several Latin American countries, including Brazil. This is particularly serious given the need to uproot the dominant actors' symbiotic

basis of political and economic power by generating socially responsible economic growth-pacts that go beyond statism and neo-liberalism.

In the second round of the survey we have followed this up through supplementary interviews and discussions – to which we shall return in our concluding report – and by including respondents from three particularly relevant issue areas:

- Attempts at alternative representation at local level
- The forming of popular rooted political parties, and
- The promotion of interest-based mass organisations.

Depressingly however, the informants in the survey coming from these issue areas have not indicated any re-orientation away from the dominant pattern.

It should finally be made clear that various sections in the survey testify to the widespread knowledge within the democracy movement of basic needs, interest and visions that are so poorly represented within the current landscape of organised politics. This represents both a unique knowledge and insight, and a potential source of democratic power. The challenge at the local as well as central level is to transform this from the limiting specific demands to broader platforms and governance agendas where demands are related to other claims and interests in clear-cut and transparent ways that can catch the imagination of broad sections of the population.

(2) Democracy implies collective action. To make a difference, citizens must have the capacity to come together within movements and organisations in favour of their ideas and interests. With Mouzelis (1986), we distinguish between integration of citizens into politics on the basis of relatively autonomous broad popular movements as against the incorporation and co-optation of people, for instance through populism and clientelism. Based on our previous research we also include 'alternative patronage', for instance when an NGO or radical party tries to provide economic or other forms of protection so that people can act more independently, at least in relation to their previous patrons. Turning to the integration of people into politics, and drawing on Tarrow (1996), we distinguish between the old anarchist or syndicalist tradition and the tradition of left socialists, social democrats and many Christian democrats. Based on empirical studies of the Indonesian context, we talk of networks, federative networks, political machines and comprehensive organisation.

According to the survey, the Indonesian pro-democrats' capacity to politicise people by including them into politics remains problematic, though some potential new options may be emerging. The dominant tendency (50%) is the continued reliance on traditional forms of incorporating people into politics through popular leaders and dependency relations. One might also add political machines to the first category. In addition, it is not always clear what lies behind general notions cited such as networking.

Table 8.3.2. Proportion of informants' indications as to what type of mobilisation is dominant amongst pro-democracy actors.

No.	Type of mobilisation	Consolidated	(instances 2nd round)	(1^{s} priority 2nd round)
1.	By way of popular leader	16%	(13%)	(19%)
2.	Through support and reward	18%	(17%)	(18%)
3.	By offering alternative protection/support	15%	(14%)	(12%)
4.	Through networking	24%	(25%)	(29%)
5.	Through more comprehensive organisation	27%		
6.	(Political machines)		(5%)	(3%)
7.	(Federation)		(14%)	(9%)
8.	(Comprehensive organisation)		(12%)	(10%)
	TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

It is interesting to break these figures down by issue areas. The general tendency revealed in so doing, is that activists related to political party-building in particular, but also some related to mass-organising, tend to be more engaged in comprehensive organising, while activists related to alternative local representation, human rights and especially anti-corruption are more inclined to opt for the networks.

It is obvious that the poor capacity of the pro-democrats to facilitate integration instead of incorporation of people into democratic politics is a fundamental problem that cannot be avoided through the continuing use of short cuts through popular leaders and alternative patrons.

(3) Finally, the dilemma of combining direct and indirect democracy. The problem of representation cannot be successfully addressed by pro-democrats who ignore governance and legislature. Direct democracy in civil society is still prioritised, at 31% of the indications. If we include various ways of drawing on the judicial system, the figure rises to 56%. However, the problem of representation will not be resolved if direct democracy and participation are ignored. Interestingly, these methods account for another 19%. Thus we are left with only 25% who - in one way or the other - combine civil society activity with governance/representation, and only 8% say that they are embarking upon the comprehensive path normally associated with society-based democratic rule of law. This trend is further accentuated if we study the first and second instance priorities. Fifty-five percent prioritise direct democracy in civil society and if we include the various judicial paths available that total reaches a 64%. Yet very few prioritise the comprehensive path, at only 2%.

Table 8.3.3. Proportion of informants' indications of what pathways pro-democratic actors use.

No.	Pathways	instances	1st priority
1.	Direct democracy through civil society	31%	55%
2.	Taking issues directly to court/legal system	13%	5%
3.	Taking issues to court via action in civil society	12%	4%
4.	Taking issues directly to the political bodies (incl. in election)	13%	6%
5.	Taking issues directly to both judicial and political bodies	6 %	7%
6.	Taking issues to political bodies via civil society	17%	10%
7.	Taking issues to both judicial and political bodies via civil society.	8%	2%
8.	No data		12%
	TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**

As in the case of the politicisation of issues and interests, in the second round of the survey we have followed up these problems with additional interviews and discussions – to which we shall return to in our concluding report – and by including respondents from three strategic issue areas already referred to above, i.e. attempts at alternative representation on the local level, the forming popular rooted political parties, and the promotion of interest-based mass organisation. With reference to the latter two in particular, there are some indications of greater interest in the political level and the more comprehensive agenda.

In general however, the pro-democrats clearly remain floating and marginalised on the sidelines of organised politics. The options available however may not be to jump on the bandwagon of conventional top-down party- or personality-oriented politics and their associated electoral machinery as these will have already been monopolised by the dominant actors. The unique potential of the movement lies in its potential for combining a good base and reputation for direct democracy in civil society with accountable and transparent representation.

8.4 Conclusions and recommendations: anchoring representation.

The movement that brought democracy to Indonesia cannot resurrect it as long as the committed actors remain 'floating' without a solid base in the margins of organised politics whilst lacking sufficient capacity to use and promote democracy. The four main conclusions and the related recommendations that follow from the results of the survey are as follows:

8.4.1 Strategic priorities
Priorities are necessary, but activists' emphasis on a few well functioning civil and political rights and associational life in civil society where they tend occupy a favourable position, does not contribute to the improvement of the defunct strategic instruments. The same is true of the prioritisation of direct democracy in civil society (and via the judicial system) at the expense of governance and legislative bodies. It is also worrying that most improvements are registered in local contexts. A shift from centralism to localism is no solution.

8.4.1.1 This is partly a question of political will. The first recommendation is, thus, that the movement needs to take a stand as to whether its activists shall continue to promote democracy form the margins in supplementary, corrective, lobbying and pressurising groups, or whether its ambitions lie in a more comprehensive alternative. There is an urgent need for the latter in view of the fact that the dominant actors are in the main monopolising and abusing democracy. There is simply no democratically sound political elite to correct, supplement and lobby.

8.4.2 Expanding the base

The social base of the movement is very uneven. Given the predominant focus on knowledge as *the* source of power, and discursive activity as *the* way of gaining legitimacy and authority, one might imagine Indonesia as a post-industrial, post-modern society.

8.4.2.1 It is encouraging, therefore, that several activists and NGOs that have this orientation seem also to be engaged in trying to broaden their base and their methods for gaining influence, thereby turning their 'floating' groups into servicing institutions of emerging popular organisations and movements. It is to be hoped that more will follow suit.

Women along with their experience and usually democratically oriented perspectives, seem to be more underrepresented than expected. The movement is thus neglecting a great potential for the rapid broadening of both its base and capacity.

8.4.2.2 One of the main priorities of the movement should be to include women and their perspectives in leading bodies and critical programmes – if necessary by way of a quota policy.

Also problematic is that the pro-democrats also tend to be almost absent from critical spaces in the political landscape, especially in relation to business (even petty business), the workplace and public administration.

8.4.2.3 It is strategically important to tackle these problems in conjunction with the poor links between central and local activities. Such improvements (in addition to existing presence in self-managed units and the public sphere) may provide a crucial platform for the major task of building more politically oriented vehicles and pacts for socially responsible development as an alternative to the unfruitful neo-liberal and statist recipes against the dominant actors' symbiotic political-*cum*-economic practices.

8.4.3 Governance agendas

If the democracy movement cannot fight the crisis of representation it will become irrelevant. The first major challenge is to develop the politicisation of the predominant issues and interests into agendas whilst also discussing principles for prioritising and

considering other interests and perspectives – thus arriving at governance agendas, platforms and programmes. Without this, there will be no viable politics of representation, and trust in the pro-democracy activists will be limited to action on specific issues only.

8.4.3.1 The movement should develop its potential strength in the form of links to emerging movements, knowledge of major socio-economic cleavages, in addition to good reputation for being principled, clean, humanistic and non-sectarian – to thus institutionalise public forums (on various levels) for moving from pressure and demands only to governance agendas also.

8.4.3.2 One may also consider specific investigation of:
- the signals that there may be a potential for a green 'left of centre' agenda and
- the somewhat surprising lack of indications of a similar potential emerging in relation to labour and liberal perspective, given recent experiences in Brazil.

8.4.4 Mobilisation structures and politics

Agendas are fine, but there must also be mobilisation and organisation. The politicisation of people is an even weaker aspect of the movement. Traditional and by and large undemocratic means for the incorporation of people into politics through populism and 'soft' forms of clientelism and protection dominate. Aside from 'networking only', this occurs in spite of some signs of a re-think and new ambitions to promote more comprehensive organising and federation to thus promote the integration of people. Some groups are already considering political party-building from below. At present though, only 25 % utilize the potential strength of the movement to combine its dynamic work for direct democracy in civil society with governance and representation.

8.4.4.1 For the democracy movement to shoulder the problem of representation, a decision must be taken to address its limitations. Given the previous recommendations for the prioritisation of the inclusion of women's perspectives and improved presence in the neglected areas of the political landscape in conjunction with the links between central and local action, it should be possible to move towards building or reforming local political formations and to federate them – on the basis of local governance agendas and with a strong focus on combining direct democracy with participation and representation.

8.4.4.2 Neither groups working at the local level, nor national level initiatives are likely to make a difference in elections at either level. The strength of the democracy movement lies in its potential to do both, and to co-ordinate. The need to avoid shifting from centralism and 'floating' practices to fragmented localism (and at worst even communitarianism beyond the basic principles of citizenship and human rights which together with democracy have been so crucial as a supra-ideology for the movement) may be better addressed through the exploration of federative frameworks and the avoidance of unitarian models. Federative frameworks may be easier to develop on the basis of existing networks and also

serve as inspiring examples in view of the currently dominant practices of decentralisation and authoritarian methods against popular resentments in e.g. Aceh and Papua.

8.4.4.3 In order for the democracy activists to retain their relevance, there is a need for increasing knowledge and training on practical politics that goes beyond theoretical notions and fine ideas. To make a difference, one cannot avoid tactics and strategies, including those to be used in relation to mainstream actors and their supporters. Mainstream politics tends to be a rather dirty business, at both local and national level, but congregating in the margins is not a solution. This is another reason why good knowledge and training, in combination with internal democracy and firm principles, are so important: as a way of keeping oneself reasonably clean whilst slugging it out in the mire.

8.4.5 Studies to facilitate agenda setting

Most of the recommendations made under points 2-5 above call for additional studies and research to be carried out on prevailing conditions, prospects and experiences made with an international comparative perspective.

9. From Problems to Options

Some eight hundred experienced and reflective democracy activists within fourteen issue-areas in thirty-two provinces have spent between four to six hours each answering three-hundred and thirty-three questions on thirteen key-variables of problems and options of meaningful HR-based democracy. The approach is new, and the result is the most comprehensive body of research-based information available on the topic thus far. Data analysis has generated four major conclusions and twenty-two proposals for further discussion and action.

I. Democratic Deficit of Rights and Institutions

Indonesia's democracy is *not* well under way *nor* 'irreversible'. There *are* basic freedoms *but* there is a severe deficit of the other instruments that are supposed to favour democracy.

1. *Do not blame democracy* for not solving the country's problems! The real problem is that the essential instruments of democracy are defunct.
2. *Stop talking about democracy in general!* The few instruments that are doing well must be defended and improved, not belittled or used to overshadow the main problems.
3. *Acknowledge that the Indonesian 'demos' is no longer unified* by a nation state project, but also that it is equally true that the *new democracy is not balkanised* – a potential basis for unity.
4. *Defend* independence not by upholding statist control of people but by fighting a democracy that severely limits economic choices as practiced under neo-liberal globalisation.
5. *Accept that* the fostering of democracy through *elitist crafting of 'good' institutions has not worked* and focus on the roots of that problem.

II. Elections but not Representation

The defunct instruments of democracy include the rule of law and 'good governance' but the most serious problem is that the free and fair elections are limited to unrepresentative and unresponsive political parties and politicians. Indonesia's fledgling democracy can not be improved in a democratic way as long as good and dynamic representation of people's ideas and interests is missing.

6. *Give top priority to the problem of political representation* by promoting:
   - Democratic, accountable and responsive political parties and interest organisations
   - Democratic forms of direct participation
7. *Demand that parliament commences a public and scholarly review* of existing and potential rules and regulations *for the promotion of democratic, representative and*

responsive political parties and unions. If this is not done, committed politicians, intellectuals and activists should initiate a similar study.

8. *Identify and foster*:
   - *The best type of elections to promote representation*, including through political parties
   - *Rules and regulations that may stimulate less abuse* of political parties, parliament etc.
   - Measures that can *support those fighting the monopolisation of democracy*.

III Oligarchic-Democracy

It is well understood that new democracies around the world suffer from persistent dominance of the elite. The problem in Indonesia is not that the elite bypasses the democratic 'game' but rather that it monopolises it, bending and abusing the rules of the game as it does so.

9. *Set aside the elitist transition-paradigm*. New institutions have been crafted and the elite play the game, but most instruments of democracy remain defunct.
10. *Give priority to breaking up the monopoly of democracy*. Accept that the vested interests of dominant actors in the monopolisation of democracy prevents improvements and calls for countervailing measures and actors.
11. *Do not try to fight the monopolisation of democracy by liberal or statist politics!* Both are part of the monopoly-breeding nexus between state and business, with deep roots since colonialism. *Explore instead the options of a social pact for <u>democratically regulated</u> de-monopolisation* between growth-oriented business, professional oriented middle classes in state and private sectors, and organised labouring people in formal as well as informal sectors, in return for improved standard of living! (This if followed up in proposal 16 and 17.)
12. *Focus on renewed agenda-setting and organisation* beyond top-driven parties, personality-oriented elections and scattered civil society activism! The dominant actors' monopoly on democracy is not fortified at the top but socially and politically well anchored and cannot be encircled from civil society.

IV Floating and Marginalised Agents of Change – with New Ambitions

The agents of change that brought democracy to Indonesia are still critical as civic activists and pressure groups, but remain 'floating' in the margins of the fledgling democratic system and are thus unable to make a real impact.

13. *Strengthen the ambitions of the movement by* going beyond the promotion of democracy through supplementary, corrective, lobbying and pressurising groups only and in addition *offering more comprehensive alternatives*. There is a shortage of a genuinely democratic political elite to correct, supplement and lobby.
14. *Broaden the currently mainly knowledge-based sources of power, and the ways of gaining influence that focus mainly on discursive activity*, by relating to and servicing emerging popular organisations and movements.

15. *Include women and their perspectives* in leading organisations and critical programmes – if necessary by way of a quota policy – to promote gender perspectives and thus swiftly broadening the base and capacity of the movement.

16. *Expand the basis of the movement to the neglected spaces of the political landscape* that relate to business, the workplace and public administration – and link these to the already existing strongholds in self-managed units and the public sphere.

17. *Institutionalise public forums on various levels in order to facilitate* the politicisation and transformation of concrete issues and interests amongst emerging movements into *governance agendas*, drawing on the reputation of being principled, transparent, accountable, humanistic and non-sectarian. Keep in mind the potential for a green 'left of centre' agenda and the need for a social pact between growth oriented business, liberal middle classes and labouring people against the roots of monopolisation. *If the democracy movement cannot fight the crisis of representation it will become irrelevant.*

18. *Move beyond traditional top-down and populist incorporation of people into politics* by building or reforming local political organisations on the basis of local governance agendas that combine direct democracy and representation. *The movement will not make a difference by relying only on direct democracy in civil society.*

19. *Develop the movement's potential to combine local and central action.* Separate local and central initiatives are unlikely, for instance, to make a difference in any elections. Do not replace the old centralism by new localism.

20. *Avoid unitarian models by exploring federative frameworks.* These may be both easier to develop from existing networks and serve as inspiring counter-examples to the predominant practices of decentralisation and authoritarian measures against popular resentment e.g. in Aceh and Papua.

21. *Prioritise training and knowledge on practical politics,* beyond the realm of fine ideas only. To make a difference, one must not avoid 'dirty' mainstream politics but strengthen internal democracy and basic principles, to keep clean in the mud.

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In short, the cornerstones of the movements' agenda to de-monopolise and resurrect democracy may thus be to widen the social base of local civic capacities, transform concrete issues and interests among emerging movements into governance agendas, federate associated political formations and foster combined forms of direct democracy in civil society and representative democracy via political institutions.

22. Engage in further studies and research to facilitate the implementation of these and further developed recommendations.

10. Towards a New Agenda

What comes next after this executive report? At this point the most urgent task is not to follow up this first survey with a restudy to trace changes over time. Such a re-survey must of course be carried out, and donors should commit themselves to the task, but this task can wait for about four years. At present we need to prioritise refining the current results and debating the conclusions in order to make a fruitful and dynamic contribution to the formulation of a new pro-democratic agenda.

The results presented in this paper will be improved upon during the process of writing the concluding book of the survey which will be presented at a conference in November 2005. The draft data supplement will be edited and subject to more detailed analysis. Comments and additional information from the forthcoming regional assessment councils with our key-informants and other experts will be incorporated. Results from a mini resurvey in conjunction with these councils will be included as well, in addition to previous and new separate interviews on strategic issues. Continuous reports will be published, in academic journals as well as in co-operation with the media, as is currently being done in collaboration with *TEMPO*.

Committed students and scholars who wish to conduct deeper analysis of special dimensions will also be given access to the data. We have aimed at the best possible and policy relevant general analysis (with qualifications for issue-areas and regions) within a short period of time and with limited resources. It is essential that close statistical *and* contextual studies are also conducted. In the latter case, our data and informants may serve as an entry point. In conjunction with the conference, a graduate course-cum-workshop will be arranged (with IF-LPD at *Universitas Gajah Mada*) for those who wish to follow up on the results and further Indonesian studies on the problems of democracy.

Meanwhile, and most importantly, we hope that these conclusions and recommendations will initiative discussions among concerned activists on how to reinvigorate the democracy movement and bring it into the centre rather than the margins of the process of democratisation. The aim of a broadened and institutionalised *DEMOS* will be to facilitate this process with more specific studies, research and advocacy. The tentative agenda for such studies should be formulated within the next few months in co-operation with the actors who wish to take part in the deliberations. The programme may then be perfected at the November conference.

DEMOS' homepage will be re-launched in the very near future in order to provide regular updates, data and resource material for this process. *******

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